Does growing economic interdependence among great powers
increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberalists
argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay
peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle
for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale
liberal-realist debate, "Economic Interdependence and War "lays out
a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific
conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of
conflict between nations.
Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the
Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises,
Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive
expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain
at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance
long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative,
leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and
markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect
their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds
important implications for the understanding of Sino-American
relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will
likely take over the next two decades.
"Economic Interdependence and War" offers sweeping new insights
into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual
nature of democratic versus economic peace.
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