This manuscript analyzes the failure of Soviet air and ground
forces to defeat the Afghan mujahideen during the nine-year Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan. In pursuit of this objective, Soviet
military strategy underwent a process of increasing radicalization
that eventually resulted in a sanctioned policy of terror by Soviet
air and land forces. During this period, airpower played a critical
role in this campaign of terror by providing the platforms for
punitive bombardment, chemical attack, aerial mining, troop
insertion, and fire support. The ability of a relatively
ill-equipped and technologically inferior opponent to force the
eventual withdrawal of one of the world's most vaunted military
powers has broader implications for contemporary political and
military leaders. Soviet military operations against the mujahideen
in Afghanistan, from December 1979 until the withdrawal of the
Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in February 1989, provide an
instructive case study for evaluating the efficacy of airpower as
an instrument of coercion. The Afghanistan example offers an
excellent historical case for measuring the inherent limitations of
airpower as a coercive instrument in the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations.
General
Imprint: |
Biblioscholar
|
Country of origin: |
United States |
Release date: |
November 2012 |
First published: |
November 2012 |
Authors: |
Edward B. Westermann
|
Dimensions: |
246 x 189 x 7mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
136 |
ISBN-13: |
978-1-288-36960-7 |
Categories: |
Books >
Social sciences >
Education >
General
Promotions
|
LSN: |
1-288-36960-3 |
Barcode: |
9781288369607 |
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