To clarify and facilitate our inquiries we need to define a
disquotational truth predicate that we are directly licensed to
apply not only to our own sentences as we use them now, but also to
other speakers' sentences and our own sentences as we used them in
the past. The conventional wisdom is that there can be no such
truth predicate. For it appears that the only instances of the
disquotational pattern that we are directly licensed to accept are
those that define "is true" for our own sentences as we use them
now. Gary Ebbs shows that this appearance is illusory. He
constructs an account of words that licenses us to rely not only on
formal (spelling-based) identifications of our own words, but also
on our non-deliberative practical identifications of other
speakers' words and of our own words as we used them in the past.
To overturn the conventional wisdom about disquotational truth,
Ebbs argues, we need only combine this account of words with our
disquotational definitions of truth for sentences as we use them
now. The result radically transforms our understanding of truth and
related topics, including anti-individualism, self-knowledge, and
the intersubjectivity of logic.
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