No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much
criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's
"Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics,
one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is
rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at
least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in
their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to
debates that strike at the very heart of contemporary philosophy of
mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch
defends Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections
that have been put forward over the past twenty years and argues
that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are
based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning; that many attacks
can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position; and
that many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or
to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace.
Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is
deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument
a new strength.
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