Volume 2 uses the economic and legal concepts/theories of Volume
1 to (1) analyze the U.S. and E.U. antitrust legality of mergers,
joint ventures, and the pricing-technique and
contractual/sales-policy distributor-control surrogates for
vertical integration and (2) assess related positions of scholars
and U.S. and E.U. antitrust officials. Its analysis of horizontal
mergers (1) delineates non-market-oriented protocols for
determining whether they manifest specific anticompetitive intent,
would lessen competition, or are rendered lawful by the
efficiencies they would generate, (2) criticizes the U.S. courts'
traditional market-share/market-concentration protocol, the
HHI-oriented protocols of the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC Guidelines and the
European Commission (EC) Guidelines, and the various
non-market-oriented protocols the DOJ/FTC have increasingly been
using, (3) argues that, although the 2010 U.S. Guidelines and
DOJ/FTC officials discuss market definition as if it matters, those
Guidelines actually reject market-oriented approaches, and (4)
reviews the relevant U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of
conglomerate mergers (1) shows that they can perform the same
legitimate and competition-increasing functions as horizontal
mergers and can yield illegitimate profits and lessen competition
by increasing contrived oligopolistic pricing and retaliation
barriers to investment, (2) analyzes the determinants of all these
effects, and (3) assesses limit-price theory, the toe-hold-merger
doctrine, and U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of vertical
conduct (1) examines the legitimate functions of each type of such
conduct, (2) delineates the conditions under which each manifests
specific anticompetitive intent and/or lessens competition, and (3)
assesses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC
positions. Its analysis of joint ventures (1) explains that they
violate U.S. law only when they manifest specific anticompetitive
intent while they violate E.U. law either for this reason or
because they lessen competition, (2) discusses the meaning of an
"ancillary restraint" and demonstrates that whether a joint-venture
agreement would be illegal if it imposed no restraints and whether
any restraints imposed are ancillary can be determined only through
case-by-case analysis, (3) explains why scholars and officials
overestimate the economic efficiency of R&D joint ventures, and
(4) discusses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC
positions. The study's Conclusion (1) reviews how its analyses
justify its innovative conceptual systems and (2) compares U.S. and
E.U. antitrust law as written and as applied."
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