This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private
sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes
a new theory of selective property rights to explain this
phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth
interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two
original national audit experiments and secondary sources,
Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China
actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance
their business interests. By securing seats in the local
legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter
local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other
types of informal payments. In doing so they create a system of
selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This
system of selective property rights is key to understanding the
private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law.
General
Imprint: |
Cambridge UniversityPress
|
Country of origin: |
United Kingdom |
Series: |
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics |
Release date: |
September 2019 |
Authors: |
Yue Hou
|
Dimensions: |
234 x 156 x 16mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Hardcover
|
Pages: |
204 |
ISBN-13: |
978-1-108-49815-9 |
Categories: |
Books >
Social sciences >
Politics & government >
Comparative politics
|
LSN: |
1-108-49815-9 |
Barcode: |
9781108498159 |
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