This book explores similarities between past and contemporary fascism and seeks to explain in what circumstances fascism develops, to whom it is attractive, and what its reemergence signifies. The book is the first attempt to link fascist ideology and practice in Europe to that in the Third World.

This book examines (1) the neglected but decisive role played by guerrillas in the Carolinas in 1780 and 1781, which led to the disastrous retreat of Cornwallis into Yorktown; (2) the 1793 uprisings in western France against the Revolutionary regime, whose conduct foreshadowed Nazi policies during World War II; (3) the French occupation of Spain from 1808 to 1814, from which the name guerrilla derives, and where the Napoleonic Empire suffered its most fatal wound; and (4) guerrilla campaigns in the American Civil War, explaining why Lee's surrender in 1865 failed to unleash the massive guerrilla outbreak feared by Lincoln and Grant. The concluding section compares the experiences of the French in Spain to those of the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the British in the Carolinas to the Americans in Vietnam.

The political practice of declaring victory and coming home has provided a false and dangerous domestic impression of great success for U.S. unilateral and multilateral interventions in failing and failed states around the world. The reality of such irresponsibility is that the root causes and the violent consequences of contemporary "intranational" conflict are left to smolder and reignite at a later date with the accompanying human and physical waste. This book discusses why it is incumbent on the international community and individual powers involved in dealing with the chaos of the post-Cold War world to understand that such action requires a long-term, holistic, and strategic approach.

The intent of such an approach is to create and establish the proven internal conditions that can lead to a mandated peace and stability--with justice. The key elements that define those conditions at the strategic level include: (1) the physical establishment of order and the rule of law; (2) the isolation of belligerents; (3) the regeneration of the economy; (4) the shaping of political consent; (5) fostering peaceful conflict resolution processes; (6) achieving a complete unity of effort toward stability; and (7) establishment and maintenance of a legitimate civil society. These essential dimensions of contemporary global security and stability requirements comprise a new paradigm that will, hopefully, initiate the process of rethinking both problem and response.

This study argues that guerrilla insurgencies will be a major feature of the post-Cold War international scene, and that the advisability of intervention in some of them will become a serious issue in American politics. Americans therefore need to refine their understanding of insurgency. Anthony James Joes analyzes several major insurgencies of this century, all of which the United States became involved in to one degree or another. While approaching each guerrilla insurgency as a primarily political phenomenon within a definite historical and cultural context, Joes also provides the reader with a clear understanding of the military aspects of such conflicts.

The book deals with a variety of cases, some currently very controversial; provides jargon-free analysis of historical, political, and military factors; challenges some widely cherished views about the potency of third-world nationalism; emphasizes the neglected but often decisive effects of geography; examines the flaws in both the French and the American strategies in Viet Nam; and connects Soviet reverses in Afghanistan with the collapse of their empire in Europe. A major conclusion is that protracted guerrilla insurgency is usually the result of inept government policies; the author outlines a politico-military strategy for bringing an insurgency to an end. Another important conclusion is that our belief in the power of nationalism in insurgencies needs reevaluation. This volume will provide a new perspective for students, teachers, and general readers interested in international affairs, war, and foreign policy.

Central to this book is the assertion that fascist regimes similar in ideology and style to Mussolini's in Italy have arisen and will continue to arise in the underdeveloped world. The author views fascism as a definite response-authoritarian corporatist nationalism-to certain problems common to late-developing nations, not as an aberration that ca

From the Carolina Swamp Fox to the Afghan Mujahideen, this book analyzes 40 guerrilla struggles across five continents, profiles important figures, and gives extensive bibliographical information. With an emphasis on causes and effects, Part I surveys and analyzes all major guerrilla struggles and many less well known wars from the American Revolution to 20th-century post-colonial conflicts. Drawing a distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the author focuses on guerrilla activity. He seeks to answer such questions as the genesis and context of an insurgency, its resemblance to other guerrilla conflicts, what factors contributed to victory or defeat, which factors are unique to a conflict, and what factors are common to many conflicts.

Part II profiles individuals who are important to the subject, including guerrilla chieftains, military commanders, government officials, party leaders, theorists, and instructors who exerted notable influence. Part III surveys the major English-language literature on guerrilla warfare, providing a a wide-ranging, representative, and intensive collection of works.

Like the widely praised original, this new edition is compact, clearly written, and accessible to the nonspecialist. First, the book chronicles and analyzes the twenty-year struggle to maintain South Vietnamese independence. Joes tells the story with a sympathetic focus on South Viet Nam and is highly critical of U.S. military strategy and tactics in fighting this war. He claims that the fall of South Viet Nam was not inevitable, that an abrupt and public termination of U.S. aid provoked a crisis of confidence inside South Viet Nam that led to the debacle. Students and scholars of military studies, South East Asia, U.S. foreign policy, or the general reader interested in this fascinating period in 20th century history, will find this new edition to be invaluable reading. After discussing the principal American mistakes in the conflict, Joes outlines a workable alternative strategy that would have saved South Viet Nam while minimizing U.S. involvement and casualties. He documents the enormous sacrifices made by the South Vietnamese allies, who in proportion to population suffered forty times the casualties the Americans did. He concludes by linking the final conquest of South Viet Nam to an increased level of Soviet adventurism which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military build-up under Presidents Carter and Reagan, and the eventual collapse of the USSR. The complicated factors involved in the war are here offered in a consolidated, objective form, enabling the reader to consider the implications of U.S. experiences in South Viet Nam for future policy in other world areas.

U.S. military forces are increasingly involved in peacekeeping missions around the world, and this new role raises the prospect of confrontation with guerrilla movements, combat for which troops are largely untrained. This book contains analyses of past and present conflicts involving the American military, not only the Vietnam experience but also more recent involvement in El Salvador and Somalia, each of which has provoked great controversy on the domestic front. The contributors also consider the experiences of other countries in meeting such threats: Russia's dangerously unstable democracy, Peru's successful efforts to defeat a notorious insurgency, and Japan's continuing reluctance to send even token military forces outside its own borders. These issues will continue to engage and challenge American society long into the next millennium.

Like the widely praised original, this new edition is compact, clearly written, and accessible to the nonspecialist. First, the book chronicles and analyzes the twenty-year struggle to maintain South Vietnamese independence. Joes tells the story with a sympathetic focus on South Viet Nam and is highly critical of U.S. military strategy and tactics in fighting this war. He claims that the fall of South Viet Nam was not inevitable, that an abrupt and public termination of U.S. aid provoked a crisis of confidence inside South Viet Nam that led to the debacle. Students and scholars of military studies, South East Asia, U.S. foreign policy, or the general reader interested in this fascinating period in 20th century history, will find this new edition to be invaluable reading.

After discussing the principal American mistakes in the conflict, Joes outlines a workable alternative strategy that would have saved South Viet Nam while minimizing U.S. involvement and casualties. He documents the enormous sacrifices made by the South Vietnamese allies, who in proportion to population suffered forty times the casualties the Americans did. He concludes by linking the final conquest of South Viet Nam to an increased level of Soviet adventurism which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military build-up under Presidents Carter and Reagan, and the eventual collapse of the USSR. The complicated factors involved in the war are here offered in a consolidated, objective form, enabling the reader to consider the implications of U.S. experiences in South Viet Nam for future policy in other world areas.