This book examines the reasons counterforce has become widely accepted in U.S. nuclear weapons policies. It discusses the implications of adherence to the counterforce doctrine despite increasing popular support for avoiding nuclear war through deterrence and arms control. .

American power has been subjected to extensive analysis since September 11, 2001. While there is no consensus on the state of US hegemony or even on the precise meaning of the term, it is clear that under George W. Bush the US has not only remained the 'lone superpower' but has increased its global military supremacy. At the same time, the US has become more dependent on its economic, financial and geopolitical relationships with the rest of the world than at any other time in its history, markedly since the events of 9/11. The distinguished scholars in this volume critically interpret US hegemony from a range of theoretical and topical perspectives. They discuss the idea of empire in the age of globalization, critique the Bush doctrine, analyze the ideologies underpinning a new American imperialism and examine the influence of neo-conservatism on US foreign and domestic policy.

Since the U.S. presidential elections of 1980, debate has intensified between those who believe that nuclear weapons can only deter a war not intended to be fought and those who see nuclear weapons as an advancement in weaponry that allows for the waging and winning of a nuclear war. At the focal point of this debate is the rise of the "counterforce" doctrine-the concept of a nuclear attack exclusively against the enemy's military forces. The author, in outlining the unresolved tension between the two approaches, examines the reasons counterforce has become widely accepted in U.S. nuclear weapons policies. He argues that many strategists are worried that the counterforce strategy is out of touch with the reality of the nuclear world and see it as merely a "technical fix" for a dilemma that may have no solution. Finally, Dr. David discusses the implications of adherence to the counterforce doctrine despite increasing popular support for avoiding nuclear war through deterrence and arms control.

Since the advent of the contemporary US national security apparatus in 1947, entrepreneurial public officials have tried to reorient the course of the nation's foreign policy. Acting inside the National Security Council system, some principals and high-ranking officials have worked tirelessly to generate policy change and innovation on the issues they care about. These entrepreneurs attempt to set the foreign policy agenda, frame policy problems and solutions, and orient the decision-making process to convince the president and other decision makers to choose the course they advocate. In National Security Entrepreneurs and the Making of American Foreign Policy Vincent Boucher, Charles-Philippe David, and Karine Prémont develop a new concept to study entrepreneurial behaviour among foreign policy advisers and offer the first comprehensive framework of analysis to answer this crucial question: why do some entrepreneurs succeed in guaranteeing the adoption of novel policies while others fail? They explore case studies of attempts to reorient US foreign policy waged by National Security Council entrepreneurs, examining the key factors enabling success and the main forces preventing the adoption of a preferred option: the entrepreneur's profile, presidential leadership, major players involved in the policy formulation and decision-making processes, the national political context, and the presence or absence of significant opportunities. By carefully analyzing significant diplomatic and military decisions of the Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton administrations, and offering a preliminary account of contemporary national security entrepreneurship under presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, this book makes the case for an agent-based explanation of foreign policy change and continuity.