The ideas of the Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) underlie most modern military thought. This intellectual history of the reception of Carl von Clausewitz's military theories in Britain and the United States thus provides an important and revealing examination of the evolution of military thinking in both countries. In the first comprehensive study of the literature, Christopher Bassford argues that the impact of Clausewitzian theory - particularly the classic On War, published in 1832 - has been widely misunderstood, and he follows the trail of Clausewitzian influence from early-Victorian Britain to 1945. He examines the attitudes and interpretations of a large array of commentators, ranging from soldiers like the Duke of Wellington, "Wully" Robertson, and Dwight Eisenhower to theorists like Julian Corbett, to journalists and historians like Spenser Wilkinson and Basil Liddell Hart, to a wide range of reformers, special pleaders, and propagandists. By exploring the changing ways in which Clausewitz's ideas have been received by these various groups of commentators, Bassford also offers some penetrating lessons concerning the manner in which ideas are ignored, acclaimed, rejected, distorted, or re-transmitted. In bringing this literature to light, Clausewitz in English makes a persuasive case for Clausewitzian theory having had a broad impact on the development of British and American military thinking. It will be of interest to a wide range of military and intellectual historians.

This book at last makes available in English a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is widely regarded as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men had vast experience in the Napoleonic Wars, and both were prominent participants in the campaign. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian army; the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff to Prussia's 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to author VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. He also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history, via the work of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbruck. Oddly, Clausewitz's study of the campaign of 1815 was never published in English, and Wellington's once-famous response to it has been strangely but studiously ignored by British military historians since 1914. Hence this book. It contains Wellington's initial battle report; Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife Marie; correspondence within Wellington's circle concerning Clausewitz's work; Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (not just the Battle of Waterloo); Wellington's memorandum in response; and enlightening essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Battle of Waterloo. Major General U.S. Army] David T. Zabecki, Ph.D., writes in the April 2011 edition of The Journal of Military History: "Long overdue, we now have two English translations of Clausewitz's] The Campaign of 1815 i.e., Peter Hofschroer's translation of Clausewitz's study and Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow's edition of the full Clausewitz-Wellington exchange]. Either of these volumes would be a welcome addition to the bookshelf of any serious student of military affairs, but On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 is clearly the richer of the two." The Editors: Christopher Bassford is Professor of Strategy at the National War College, in Washington, DC. Daniel Moran is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, CA. Gregory W. Pedlow is Chief of the Historical Office at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium.