"Steel Wind" is a piece of historical detective work that explains how Colonel Georg Bruchmuller, an obscure German artillery officer recalled from retirement, played a pivotal role in the revolution of offensive tactics that took place in 1917-18. Ironically, the methods developed by Bruchmuller ultimately were rejected by the German Army of World War II, but they were taken up and applied with a vengeance by the emerging Red Army. The Soviets further developed Bruchmuller's principles and incorporated them into their doctrine, where they remain to this day. Through Soviet doctrine, they have become fundamental to the practice of many other armies. Bruchmuller's influence in shaping the former Soviet Army has also been mirrored in the shape of those armies designed to oppose it.

This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the 1918 Offensives to focus on the 'operational level of war' and on the body of military activity known as 'the operational art', rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels. This book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in general.

At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate.
Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both world wars.
Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this book evaluates the German approachto the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks, instead of attacking key Allied vulnerabilities.
The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities theGermans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both essential rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

The Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, marked a critical turning point in the European theater of World War II. The massive landing on France's coast had been meticulously planned for three years, and the Allies anticipated a quick and decisive defeat of the German forces. Many of the planners were surprised, however, by the length of time it ultimately took to defeat the Germans. While much has been written about D-day, very little has been written about the crucial period from August to September, immediately after the invasion. In Ruckzug, Joachim Ludewig draws on military records from both sides to show that a quick defeat of the Germans was hindered by excessive caution and a lack of strategic boldness on the part of the Allies, as well as by the Germans' tactical skill and energy. This intriguing study, translated from German, not only examines a significant and often overlooked phase of the war, but also offers a valuable account of the conflict from the perspective of the German forces.

The Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, marked a critical turning point in the European theater of World War II. The massive landing on France's coast had been meticulously planned for three years, and the Allies anticipated a quick and decisive defeat of the German forces. Many of the planners were surprised, however, by the length of time it ultimately took to defeat the Germans. While much has been written about D-day, very little has been written about the crucial period from August to September, immediately after the invasion. In Ruckzug, Joachim Ludewig draws on military records from both sides to show that a quick defeat of the Germans was hindered by excessive caution and a lack of strategic boldness on the part of the Allies, as well as by the Germans' tactical skill and energy. This intriguing study, translated from German, not only examines a significant and often overlooked phase of the war, but also offers a valuable account of the conflict from the perspective of the German forces.

This invaluable resource offers students a comprehensive overview of the German war machine that overran much of Europe during World War II, with close to 300 entries on a variety of topics and a number of key primary source documents. This book provides everything the reader needs to know about the German war machine that developed into the potent armed force under Adolf Hitler. This expansive encyclopedia covers the period of the German Third Reich, from January 1933 to the end of World War II in Europe, in May 1945. Dozens of entries on key battles and military campaigns, military and political leaders, military and intelligence organizations, and social and political topics that shaped German military conduct during World War II are followed by an illuminating epilogue that outlines why Germany lost World War II. A documents section includes more than a dozen fascinating primary sources on such significant events as the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan; the Battle of Stalingrad; the Normandy Invasion; the Ardennes Offensive; and Germany's surrender. In addition, six appendices provide detailed information on a variety of topics such as German aces, military commanders, and military medals and decorations. The book ends with a chronology and a bibliography of print resources. Presents a comprehensive overview of how the German Army was able to rebuild itself from the ground up following World War I Explains how flawed German strategy blundered the country into a two- and even three-front war it could not hope to win Explores the contradiction of Wehrmacht complicity in the rise of the Nazis and the Holocaust, and the fact that a group of Wehrmacht officers formed Germany's only viable internal opposition to Hitler Examines many of the less popularly known but key German military leaders such as Ludwig Beck, Adolf Heusinger, Hans Speidel, Johannes Steinhoff, and Siegfried Westphal

While scholarship abounds on the diplomatic and security aspects of the Cold War, very little attention has been paid to military planning at the operational level. In Blueprints for Battle, experts from Russia, the United States, and Europe address this dearth by closely examining the military planning of NATO and Warsaw Pact member nations from the end of World War II to the beginning of detente. Informed by material from recently opened archives, this collection investigates the perceptions and actions of the rival coalitions, exploring the challenges presented by nuclear technology, examining how military commanders' perceptions changed from the 1950s to the 1960s, and discussing logistical coordination among allied states. The result is a detailed study that offers much-needed new perspectives on the military aspects of the early Cold War.

World War I had a profound impact on the United States of America, which was forced to 'grow' an army almost overnight. The day the United States declared war on Germany, the US Army was only the 17th largest in the world, ranking behind Portugal - the Regular Army had only 128,00 troops, backed up by the National Guard with some 182,000 troops. By the end of the war it had grown to 3,700,000, with slightly more than half that number in Europe. Until the United States did so, no country in all history had tried to deploy a 2-million-man force 3,000 miles from its own borders, a force led by American Expeditionary Forces Commander-in-Chief General John J. Pershing. This was America's first truly modern war and rising from its ranks was a new generation of leaders who would control the fate of the United States armed forces during the interwar period and into World War II. This book reveals the history of the key leaders working for and with John J. Pershing during this tumultuous period, including George S. Patton (tank commander and future commander of the US Third Army during World War II); Douglas MacArthur (42nd Division commander and future General of the Army) and Harry S. Truman (artillery battery commander and future President of the United States). Edited by Major General David T. Zabecki (US Army, Retired) and Colonel Douglas V. Mastriano (US Army, Retired), this fascinating title comprises chapters on individual leaders from subject experts across the US, including faculty members of the US Army War College.

Written by experts for use by nonexperts, this monumental work probes Germany's "Genius for War" and the unmistakable pattern of tactical and operational innovation and excellence evident throughout the nation's military history. Despite having the best military forces in the world, some of the most advanced weapons available, and unparalleled tactical proficiency, Germany still lost both World Wars. This landmark, four-volume encyclopedia explores how and why that happened, at the same time examining Germany as a military power from the start of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 to the present day. Coverage includes the Federal Republic of Germany, its predecessor states, and the kingdoms and principalities that combined to form Imperial Germany in 1871. The Seven Years' War is discussed, as are the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars of German Unification (including the Franco-Prussian War), World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. In all, more than 1,000 entries illuminate battles, organizations, leaders, armies, weapons, and other aspects of war and military life. The most comprehensive overview of German military history ever to appear in English, this work will enable students and others interested in military history to better understand the sociopolitical history of Germany, the complex role conflict has played in the nation throughout its history, and why Germany continues to be an important player on the European continent.

Known as the War to End all Wars and the Great War, World War I introduced new forms of mass destruction and modern technological warfare. When the Bolsheviks pulled Russia out of the war in late 1917, the Germans turned their offensive efforts to the Western Front in an attempt to win the war in 1918. But as fresh American troops entered Europe, the strategic scales tipped against Germany. Much of how World War I played out turned on the plans and decisions of the senior-most German and Allied commanders. The Generals' War explores the military strategies of those generals during the last year of the Great War. These six very different men included Germany's Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff; France's Marshals Ferdinand Foch and Philippe Petain; Great Britain's Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig; and the United States' General John Pershing. Although history remembers none of them as great captains, these six officers determined for better or worse how World War I was fought on the battlefields of the Western Front between November 1917 and November 1918. The Generals' War is a landmark exploration of the generalship that shaped the very framework of modern warfare as we know it today and provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis on the senior commanders of the Great War.

General Fritz von Lossberg (1868--1942) directed virtually all the major German defensive battles on the Western Front during the First World War. Hailed as "the Lion of the Defensive," he was an extremely influential military tactician and, unlike many other operations officers of his era, was quick to grasp the changes wrought by technology. Now available for the first time in English, Lossberg's memoir explains how he developed, tested, and implemented his central principles -- flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack -- which were based on a need to adapt to shifting conditions on the battlefield. Lossberg first put his theory of elastic defense combined with defense-in-depth into practice during the Battle of Arras (April--May 1917), where it succeeded. At the Battle of Passchendaele (June--November 1917), his achievements on the field proved the feasibility of his strategy of employing a thinly manned front line that minimized the number of soldiers exposed to artillery fire. Lossberg's tactical modernizations have become essential components of army doctrine, and Lossberg's War: The World War I Memoirs of A German Chief of Staff will take readers inside the mind of one of the most significant military innovators of the twentieth century.

"Indispensable."--Prof. Robert Citino, author of The Path to Blitzkrieg "The most influential doctrinal manual ever written."--Prof. Williamson Murray, author of A War to Be Won: *Highly readable translation of the military manual that guided the German Army in World War II*Crystal-clear introduction and notes place the text in its social and military context*Topics include command, attack, defense, tanks, chemical warfare, logistics, and more: Truppenfhrung ("unit command") served as the basic manual for the German Army from 1934 until the end of World War II, creating the doctrinal framework for blitzkrieg and the early victories of Hitler's armies. All commissioned and senior noncommissioned officers received a copy of the book, which set forth guidelines to be applied to complex and constantly changing battle conditions. Reading it is essential to understanding how the German Army fought the war.

In 2018, the world will be commemorating the centenary of the end of the First World War. In many ways, 1918 was the most dramatic year of the conflict. After the defeat of Russia in 1917, the Germans were able to concentrate their forces on the Western Front for the first time in the war, and the German offensives launched from March 1918 onward brought the Western Allies close to defeat. Having stopped the German offensives, the Entente started its counter-attacks on all fronts with the assistance of fresh US troops, driving the Germans back and, by November 1918, the Central Powers had been defeated.

This new study is a multi-author work containing ten chapters by some of the best historians of the First World War from around the world writing today. It provides an overview and analysis of the different levels of war for each of the main armies involved within the changing context of the reality of warfare in 1918. It also looks in detail at the war at sea and in the air, and considers the aftermath and legacy of the First World War.