|
Showing 1 - 8 of
8 matches in All Departments
This book has grown out of a conference on "Degrees of Belief" that
was held at the University of Konstanz in July 2004, organised by
Luc Bovens, Wolfgang Spohn, and the editors. The event was
supported by the German Research Fo- dation (DFG), the Philosophy,
Probability, and Modeling (PPM) Group, and the
CenterforJuniorResearchFellows(since2008:
Zukunftskolleg)attheUniversityof Konstanz. The PPM Group itself -
of which the editors were members at the time - was sponsored by a
So a Kovalevskaja Award by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Program for
the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government to Luc
Bovens, who co-directed the PPM Group with Stephan Hartmann. The
publication of this book received further support from the Emmy
Noether Junior Research Group Formal Epistemology at the
Zukunftskolleg and the Department of Philosophy at the U- versity
of Konstanz, directed by Franz Huber, and funded by the DFG. We
thank everyone involved for their support. Dedicated to the memory
of Philippe Smets and Henry Kyburg. Konstanz, Germany Franz Huber
Christoph Schmidt-Petri v Contents Belief and Degrees of Belief. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 1 Franz Huber Part I Plain Belief and Degrees of Belief
Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Richard Foley The Lockean Thesis and
the Logic of Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 49 James Hawthorne Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75 Keith Frankish Part II What Laws Should Degrees of Belief Obey?
Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
This book has grown out of a conference on "Degrees of Belief" that
was held at the University of Konstanz in July 2004, organised by
Luc Bovens, Wolfgang Spohn, and the editors. The event was
supported by the German Research Fo- dation (DFG), the Philosophy,
Probability, and Modeling (PPM) Group, and the
CenterforJuniorResearchFellows(since2008:
Zukunftskolleg)attheUniversityof Konstanz. The PPM Group itself -
of which the editors were members at the time - was sponsored by a
So a Kovalevskaja Award by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Program for
the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government to Luc
Bovens, who co-directed the PPM Group with Stephan Hartmann. The
publication of this book received further support from the Emmy
Noether Junior Research Group Formal Epistemology at the
Zukunftskolleg and the Department of Philosophy at the U- versity
of Konstanz, directed by Franz Huber, and funded by the DFG. We
thank everyone involved for their support. Dedicated to the memory
of Philippe Smets and Henry Kyburg. Konstanz, Germany Franz Huber
Christoph Schmidt-Petri v Contents Belief and Degrees of Belief. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 1 Franz Huber Part I Plain Belief and Degrees of Belief
Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Richard Foley The Lockean Thesis and
the Logic of Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 49 James Hawthorne Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75 Keith Frankish Part II What Laws Should Degrees of Belief Obey?
Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
This is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It
provides an introduction to ranking theory, which is a powerful
formal theory with a broad range of applications in different areas
of analytic philosophy. Drawing on formal logic, ranking theory can
account for degrees of belief, which can change with the
introduction of new information. In Belief and Counterfactuals,
Franz Huber applies ranking theory and belief revision to
metaphysics and epistemology. Though based on his technical
writings, the volume is intended to be as accessible as possible,
in order to fully present the utility of ranking theory to a wide
range of philosophical issues. The volume contains several novel
arguments, accounts, and applications-including the consistency
argument for ranking theory, the conditional theory of conditional
belief, as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief
change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. Huber also
presents a defense of the instrumentalist understanding of
normativity, or rationality, and an argument for the thesis that
there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical
imperatives. His distinctive use of means-end philosophy as a
unifying methodological approach establishes a treatment of
philosophy as a normative discipline, and of philosophical problems
as entangled with one another. This position also explains the
importance of logic to philosophy, without devolving into a
separate technical theory.
A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction is a textbook
on the mathematics of the probability calculus and its applications
in philosophy. On the mathematical side, the textbook introduces
these parts of logic and set theory that are needed for a precise
formulation of the probability calculus. On the philosophical side,
the main focus is on the problem of induction and its reception in
epistemology and the philosophy of science. Particular emphasis is
placed on the means-end approach to the justification of inductive
inference rules. In addition, the book discusses the major
interpretations of probability. These are philosophical accounts of
the nature of probability that interpret the mathematical structure
of the probability calculus. Besides the classical and logical
interpretation, they include the interpretation of probability as
chance, degree of belief, and relative frequency. The Bayesian
interpretation of probability as degree of belief locates
probability in a subject's mind. It raises the question why her
degrees of belief ought to obey the probability calculus. In
contrast to this, chance and relative frequency belong to the
external world. While chance is postulated by theory, relative
frequencies can be observed empirically. A Logical Introduction to
Probability and Induction aims to equip students with the ability
to successfully carry out arguments. It begins with elementary
deductive logic and uses it as basis for the material on
probability and induction. Throughout the textbook results are
carefully proved using the inference rules introduced at the
beginning, and students are asked to solve problems in the form of
50 exercises. An instructor's manual contains the solutions to
these exercises as well as suggested exam questions. The book does
not presuppose any background in mathematics, although sections
10.3-10.9 on statistics are technically sophisticated and optional.
The textbook is suitable for lower level undergraduate courses in
philosophy and logic.
A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction is a textbook
on the mathematics of the probability calculus and its applications
in philosophy. On the mathematical side, the textbook introduces
these parts of logic and set theory that are needed for a precise
formulation of the probability calculus. On the philosophical side,
the main focus is on the problem of induction and its reception in
epistemology and the philosophy of science. Particular emphasis is
placed on the means-end approach to the justification of inductive
inference rules. In addition, the book discusses the major
interpretations of probability. These are philosophical accounts of
the nature of probability that interpret the mathematical structure
of the probability calculus. Besides the classical and logical
interpretation, they include the interpretation of probability as
chance, degree of belief, and relative frequency. The Bayesian
interpretation of probability as degree of belief locates
probability in a subject's mind. It raises the question why her
degrees of belief ought to obey the probability calculus. In
contrast to this, chance and relative frequency belong to the
external world. While chance is postulated by theory, relative
frequencies can be observed empirically. A Logical Introduction to
Probability and Induction aims to equip students with the ability
to successfully carry out arguments. It begins with elementary
deductive logic and uses it as basis for the material on
probability and induction. Throughout the textbook results are
carefully proved using the inference rules introduced at the
beginning, and students are asked to solve problems in the form of
50 exercises. An instructor's manual contains the solutions to
these exercises as well as suggested exam questions. The book does
not presuppose any background in mathematics, although sections
10.3-10.9 on statistics are technically sophisticated and optional.
The textbook is suitable for lower level undergraduate courses in
philosophy and logic.
|
|