The volume at hand, Dr. George F. Howe's American Signals Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe is important professional reading for those interested in cryptologic history or in World War II. Dr. Howe's book deals primarily with organizational matters for providing SIGINT support in combat. Thus, the reader will not find stories of high-level cryptanalysis underlying big decisions by famous leaders. In my estimation, by concentrating on the less flashy aspects of wartime support in favor of the background work, Dr. Howe has again added a dimension of great worth to our knowledge of SIGINT and of the war. The study of World War II SIGINT has concentrated, by and large, on ULTRA, the exploitation of high-grade cryptographic systems used by Germany and Japan, and the use of ULTRA material by senior wartime decision makers. This effort unquestionably is important for understanding the decisions and events of that terrible era, but the overwhelming focus on this aspect has resulted in a slightly skewed understanding. The production of ULTRA and its effective use depended on a strong and well-organized structure working in conjunction with now-legendary cryptanalysts. Since the distribution of ULTRA was limited to a small number of officers and civilian leaders, the bulk of SIGINT support to the warfighter cam from tactical SIGINT units working at or near the front lines. This is an important subject for understanding what happened in World War II and for studying the principles of SIGINT organization today. United State Cryptologic History, Sources in Cryptologic History, National Security Agency.

The history of initial actions in a war contains lessons of special value for the professional soldier and for all students of military problems. Northwest Africa abounds in such lessons, for it covers the first massive commitments of American forces in World War II. The continent of Africa became a gigantic testing ground of tactics, weapons, and training evolved through years of peace. The invasion stretched American resources to the limit. Simultaneously the country was trying to maintain a line of communications to Australia, to conduct a campaign at Guadalcanal, to support China in the war against Japan, to arm and supply Russia's hard-pressed armies on the Eastern Front, to overcome the U-boat menace in the Atlantic, to fulfill lend-lease commitments, and to accumulate the means to penetrate the heart of the German and Japanese homelands. The Anglo-American allies could carry out the occupation of Northwest Africa only by making sacrifices all along the line. Two campaigns occurred there: Operation TORCH which swiftly liberated French North Africa from Vichy French control, followed by a longer Allied effort to destroy all the military forces of the Axis powers in Africa. The latter concentrated in Tunisia, where the front at one time extended more than 375 miles, and fighting progressed from scattered meeting engagements to the final concentric thrust of American, British, and French ground and air forces against two German and Italian armies massed in the vicinity of Bizerte and Tunis. The planning, preparation, and conduct of the Allied operations in Northwest Africa tested and strengthened the Anglo-American alliance. Under General Dwight D. Eisenhower a novel form of command evolved which proved superior to adversities and capable of overwhelming the enemy. Richard W. Stephens Maj. Gen., U.S.A. Chief of Military History