EU policy in the area of corporate governance and capital markets is being reoriented. Harmonization is less frequently seen as a concept in company law; regulatory competition is on the rise; and experiments in soft law are being carried out. Several Member States have recently reformed their corporate laws, wither as a reaction to financial scandals or in an effort to enhance investment. Convergence has increased as a result, particularly towards Anglo-American standards. Yet differences still exist, profoundly rooted in national systems of corporate governance. By contrast, capital markets law would seem to be an exception, having undergone intense harmonization in the last few years through the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture. Nonetheless, a European system of securities regulation is not yet in place. Regulation is predominantly domestic, while private laws affecting capital markets are still divergent. This volume examines the ongoing debate from an interdisciplinary perspective. Part 1 explores the political determinants of corporate governance and evaluates likely convergence and the role of regulatory competition. Part 2 considers the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) and its central role in harmonizing EU securities trading. Part 3 analyzes the MiFID more deeply and explores other measures including the Prospectus and Transparency Directives. Part 4 offers future perspectives on the post-FSAP era.

The EU is moving towards the full implementation of the Investment Services Directive (ISD). Indeed, in some Member States, implementation has been or will be complemented by further changes to the domestic legal framework in order to cater more effectively for increased competition among financial institutions and markets. This book analyzes these developments from a legal and economic perspective and includes papers written by academics and practitioners from Europe and the US. Some papers examine critical aspects of the ISD from a comparative viewpoint, in particular considering whether further harmonization would be appropriate. Special attention is paid to the regulation of financial exchanges in the new competitive arena and to the need for co-operation between supervisors. The volume is aimed at all those involved in European securities and derivatives markets in either a legal or economic capacity. It will be of interest to banking and financial lawyers, financial economists, regulators, exchanges and intermediaries.

The aim of this edited volume is to bring together the views of expert academics and practitioners on the latest regulatory developments in sustainable finance in Europe. The volume includes a wide range of cutting-edge issues, which relate to three main themes along which the volume is structured: (1) corporate governance; (2) financial stability; and (3) financial markets. With individual contributions deploying different methods of analysis, including theoretical contributions on the status quo of macro-financial research as well as law and economics approaches, the collection encourages interdisciplinary readership and will appeal to those researching capital markets law, European financial law, and sustainable finance, as well as practitioners within the finance industry.

With contributions by distinguished scholars from legal and financial backgrounds, this collection of essays analyses four main topics in the corporate governance of European listed firms: (i) board structure, composition and functioning and their interaction with ownership structure; (ii) board remuneration; (iii) shareholder activism and (iv) corporate governance disclosure based on the 'comply or explain' approach. The authors provide new comparative evidence and analyse its implications for the policy debate. They challenge the conventional wisdom that corporate governance in European firms was systematically dysfunctional. While proposals aimed at increasing disclosure and accountability are usually well-grounded, caution is suggested when bringing forward regulatory changes with respect to proposals targeting specific governance arrangements, especially in the fields of board composition and shareholder activism. They argue that the 'comply or explain' principle should be retained and further efforts should be exercised to enhance disclosure.