What are moral rights? What role do they play in liberalism? Which rights do we have? Does the language of rights impose formal constraints? Which rights and duties does equality force us to acknowledge? Are rights universal or culture-bound? How should global institutions promote human rights? These are the central questions discussed in this volume. All the contributors are leading figures in moral, legal, or political philosophy, and their papers are published here for the first time. The reader will therefore find in this volume a unique opportunity to acquire a direct acquaintance with some of the most recent developments in the above fields. Although the general tone of the contributions is polemical and rigorous, most of the material will be useful to the specialized reader as well as to the university student.

In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy (let alone repressive or non-democratic societies) cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets.

What are moral rights? What role do they play in liberalism? Which rights do we have? Does the language of rights impose formal constraints? Which rights and duties does equality force us to acknowledge? Are rights universal or culture-bound? How should global institutions promote human rights? These are the central questions discussed in this volume. All the contributors are leading figures in moral, legal, or political philosophy, and their papers are published here for the first time. The reader will therefore find in this volume a unique opportunity to acquire a direct acquaintance with some of the most recent developments in the above fields. Although the general tone of the contributions is polemical and rigorous, most of the material will be useful to the specialized reader as well as to the university student.

In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy (let alone repressive or non-democratic societies) cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets.