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This volume considers forms of information manipulation and
restriction in contemporary society. It explores whether and when
manipulation of the conditions of inquiry without the consent of
those manipulated is morally or epistemically justified. The
contributors provide a wealth of examples of manipulation, and
debate whether epistemic paternalism is distinct from other forms
of paternalism debated in political theory. Special attention is
given to medical practice, for science communication, and for
research in science, technology, and society. Some of the
contributors argue that unconsenting interference with people's
ability of inquire is consistent with, and others that it is
inconsistent with, efforts to democratize knowledge and
decision-making. These differences invite theoretical reflection
regarding which goods are fundamental, whether there is a clear or
only a moving boundary between informing and instructing, and
whether manipulation of people's epistemic conditions amounts to a
type of intellectual injustice. The collection pays special
attention to contemporary paternalistic practices in big data and
scientific research, as the way in which the flow of information or
knowledge might be curtailed by the manipulations of a small body
of experts or algorithms.
To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then,
so does "My faith holds value in God's plan, while yours does not."
This book argues that these two concerns - with the concept of
religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential
ascriptions of religious value - are inextricably connected. It
argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied
from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social
scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency among
adherents of different faith traditions to invoke asymmetric
explanations of the religious value or salvific status of the home
religion vis-a-vis all others. Attributions of good/bad religious
luck and exclusivist dismissal of the significance of religious
disagreement are the central phenomena that the book studies. Part
I lays out a taxonomy of kinds of religious luck, a taxonomy that
draws upon but extends work on moral and epistemic luck. It asks:
What is going on when persons, theologies, or purported revelations
ascribe various kinds of religiously-relevant traits to insiders
and outsiders of a faith tradition in sharply asymmetric fashion?
"I am saved but you are lost"; "My religion is holy but yours is
idolatrous"; "My faith tradition is true, and valued by God, but
yours is false and valueless." Part II further develops the theory
introduced in Part I, pushing forward both the
descriptive/explanatory and normative sides of what the author
terms his inductive risk account. Firstly, the concept of inductive
risk is shown to contribute to the needed field of comparative
fundamentalism by suggesting new psychological markers of
fundamentalist orientation. The second side of what is termed an
inductive risk account is concerned with the epistemology of
religious belief, but more especially with an account of the limits
of reasonable religious disagreement. Problems of inductively risky
modes of belief-formation problematize claims to religion-specific
knowledge. But the inductive risk account does not aim to set
religion apart, or to challenge the reasonableness of religious
belief tout court. Rather the burden of the argument is to
challenge the reasonableness of attitudes of religious exclusivism,
and to demotivate the "polemical apologetics" that exclusivists
practice and hope to normalize.
Virtue theory, natural law, deontology, utilitarianism,
existentialism: these are the basic moral theories taught in
"Ethics," "History of Philosophy," and "Introduction to Philosophy"
courses throughout the United States. When the American philosopher
William James (1842 - 1910) find his way into these conversations,
there is uncertainty about where his thinking fits. While
utilitarianism has become the default position for teaching James's
pragmatism and radical empiricism, this default position fails to
address and explain James's multiple criticisms of John Stuart
Mill's formulaic approach to questions concerning the moral life.
Through close readings of James's writings, the chapters in William
James, Moral Philosophy, and the Ethical Life catalogue the ways in
which James wants to avoid the following: (a) the hierarchies of
Christian natural law theory, (b) the moral calculus of Mill's
utilitarianism, (c) the absolutism and principle-ism of Immanuel
Kant's deontology, and (d) the staticity of the virtues found in
Aristotle's moral theory. Elaborating upon and clarifying James's
differences from these dominant moral theories is a crucial feature
of this collection. This collection, is not, however, intended to
be wholly negative - that is, only describing to readers what
James's moral theory is not. It seeks to articulate the positive
features of James's ethics and moral reasoning: what does it mean
to an ethical life, and how should we theorize about morality?
There have been many books over the past decade, including
outstanding collections of essays, on the topic of the ethical
virtues and virtue-theoretic approaches in ethics. But the
professional journals of philosophy have only recently seen a
strong and growing interest in the intellectual virtues and in the
development of virtue-theoretic approaches in epistemology. There
have been four single-authored book length treatments of issues of
virtue epistemology over the last seven years, beginning with
Ernest Sosa's Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge, 1991), and
extending to Linda Zabzebski's Virtue of the Mind (Cambridge,
1996). Weighing in with Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues
and the Life of the Mind (1992), and James Montmarquet's Epistemic
Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (1993), Rowman & Littlefield
has had a particularly strong interest in the direction and growth
of the field. To date, there has been no collection of articles
directly devoted to the growing debate over the possibility and
potential of a virtue epistemology. This volume exists in the
belief that there is now a timely opportunity to gather together
the best contributions of the influential authors working in this
growing area of epistemological research, and to create a
collection of essays as a useful course text and research source.
Several of the articles included in the volume are previously
unpublished. Several essays discuss the range and general approach
of virtue theory in comparison with other general accounts. What
advantages are supposed to accrue from a virtue-based account in
epistemology, in handling well-known problems such as "Gettier,"
and "Evil-Genie"-type problems? Can reliabilist virtue epistemology
handle skeptical challenges more satisfactorily than
non-virtue-centered forms of epistemic reliabilism? Others provide
a needed discussion of relevant analogies and disanalogies between
ethical and epistemic evaluation. The readings all contribute
This volume considers forms of information manipulation and
restriction in contemporary society. It explores whether and when
manipulation of the conditions of inquiry without the consent of
those manipulated is morally or epistemically justified. The
contributors provide a wealth of examples of manipulation, and
debate whether epistemic paternalism is distinct from other forms
of paternalism debated in political theory. Special attention is
given to medical practice, for science communication, and for
research in science, technology, and society. Some of the
contributors argue that unconsenting interference with people's
ability of inquire is consistent with, and others that it is
inconsistent with, efforts to democratize knowledge and
decision-making. These differences invite theoretical reflection
regarding which goods are fundamental, whether there is a clear or
only a moving boundary between informing and instructing, and
whether manipulation of people's epistemic conditions amounts to a
type of intellectual injustice. The collection pays special
attention to contemporary paternalistic practices in big data and
scientific research, as the way in which the flow of information or
knowledge might be curtailed by the manipulations of a small body
of experts or algorithms.
Virtue theory, natural law, deontology, utilitarianism,
existentialism: these are the basic moral theories taught in
"Ethics," "History of Philosophy," and "Introduction to Philosophy"
courses throughout the United States. When the American philosopher
William James (1842 - 1910) find his way into these conversations,
there is uncertainty about where his thinking fits. While
utilitarianism has become the default position for teaching James's
pragmatism and radical empiricism, this default position fails to
address and explain James's multiple criticisms of John Stuart
Mill's formulaic approach to questions concerning the moral life.
Through close readings of James's writings, the chapters in William
James, Moral Philosophy, and the Ethical Life catalogue the ways in
which James wants to avoid the following: (a) the hierarchies of
Christian natural law theory, (b) the moral calculus of Mill's
utilitarianism, (c) the absolutism and principle-ism of Immanuel
Kant's deontology, and (d) the staticity of the virtues found in
Aristotle's moral theory. Elaborating upon and clarifying James's
differences from these dominant moral theories is a crucial feature
of this collection. This collection, is not, however, intended to
be wholly negative - that is, only describing to readers what
James's moral theory is not. It seeks to articulate the positive
features of James's ethics and moral reasoning: what does it mean
to an ethical life, and how should we theorize about morality?
To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then,
so does "My faith holds value in God's plan, while yours does not."
This book argues that these two concerns - with the concept of
religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential
ascriptions of religious value - are inextricably connected. It
argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied
from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social
scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency among
adherents of different faith traditions to invoke asymmetric
explanations of the religious value or salvific status of the home
religion vis-a-vis all others. Attributions of good/bad religious
luck and exclusivist dismissal of the significance of religious
disagreement are the central phenomena that the book studies. Part
I lays out a taxonomy of kinds of religious luck, a taxonomy that
draws upon but extends work on moral and epistemic luck. It asks:
What is going on when persons, theologies, or purported revelations
ascribe various kinds of religiously-relevant traits to insiders
and outsiders of a faith tradition in sharply asymmetric fashion?
"I am saved but you are lost"; "My religion is holy but yours is
idolatrous"; "My faith tradition is true, and valued by God, but
yours is false and valueless." Part II further develops the theory
introduced in Part I, pushing forward both the
descriptive/explanatory and normative sides of what the author
terms his inductive risk account. Firstly, the concept of inductive
risk is shown to contribute to the needed field of comparative
fundamentalism by suggesting new psychological markers of
fundamentalist orientation. The second side of what is termed an
inductive risk account is concerned with the epistemology of
religious belief, but more especially with an account of the limits
of reasonable religious disagreement. Problems of inductively risky
modes of belief-formation problematize claims to religion-specific
knowledge. But the inductive risk account does not aim to set
religion apart, or to challenge the reasonableness of religious
belief tout court. Rather the burden of the argument is to
challenge the reasonableness of attitudes of religious exclusivism,
and to demotivate the "polemical apologetics" that exclusivists
practice and hope to normalize.
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