For centuries, the starting points for serious thought about ethics, justice, and government were traditions founded, in China by Confucius, and in the West by his near contemporary Socrates. In both classical traditions, norms were based on human nature; to contravene these norms was to deny part of one's humanity. The Chinese and Western philosophical traditions have often been regarded as mutually unintelligible. This book shows that the differences can only be understood by examining where they converge. It describes the role of these traditions in two political achievements: the formation of the constitutions of Song dynasty China and the American Republic. Both traditions went into eclipse for similar reasons but with quite different consequences: in China, the growth of absolutism, and in the West, the inability of modern political and ethical thought to defend the most fundamental values.

This collection of readings places side by side the principal doctrines of contracts, torts, unjust enrichment, and property in the cases of the United States, England, France, Germany and China. It presents code provisions, cases, and other legal materials that describe the law in force, and places each doctrine in its historical context to enable an understanding of the development of law as an ongoing process, in which the resolution of current issues depends upon how past issues were resolved. It both provides a road map of the private law of these jurisdictions, and illustrates how private law has been shaped by history, by the effort to solve common problems, and by differences in culture. This new edition reflects changes in the law, and includes the addition of Chinese Law as a comparative study.

Foundations of Private Law is a treatise on the Western law of property, contract, tort and unjust enrichment in both common law systems and civil law systems. The thesis of the book is that underlying these fields of law are common principles, and that these principles can be used to explain the history and development of these areas. These underlying common principles are matters of common sense, which were given their archetypal expression by older jurists who wrote in the Aristotelian tradition. These principles shaped the development of Western law but can resolve legal problems which these older writers did not confront.

This collection of readings places side by side the principal doctrines of contracts, torts, unjust enrichment, and property in the cases of the United States, England, France, Germany and China. It presents code provisions, cases, and other legal materials that describe the law in force, and places each doctrine in its historical context to enable an understanding of the development of law as an ongoing process, in which the resolution of current issues depends upon how past issues were resolved. It both provides a road map of the private law of these jurisdictions, and illustrates how private law has been shaped by history, by the effort to solve common problems, and by differences in culture. This new edition reflects changes in the law, and includes the addition of Chinese Law as a comparative study.

Cases arising from disputes between neighbours (what English law would describe in terms of the law of nuisance) fall towards the edge of the law of tort, on its boundary with the law of property. They therefore provide a good example of how the categorisation of a case can affect the liability rule: tort law is typically concerned with fault, property law with strict liability. The aim of this book is to examine the importance of these category shifts, as well as the extent to which statutory interventions, planning control and the like have had an impact on the analysis of tortuous liability.

Civil law and common law systems are held to enforce promises differently: civil law, in principle, will enforce any promise, while common law will enforce only those with 'consideration'. In that respect, modern civil law supposedly differs from the Roman law from which it descended, where a promise was enforced depending on the type of contract the parties had made. This 2001 volume is concerned with the extent to which these characterizations are true, and how these and other differences affect the enforceability of promises. Beginning with a concise history of these distinctions, the volume then considers how twelve European legal systems would deal with fifteen concrete situations. Finally, a comparative section considers why legal systems enforce certain promises and not others, and what promises should be enforced. This is the second completed project of The Common Core of European Private Law launched at the University of Trento.

One of the great enterprises of the nineteenth century was to systematize the law of contracts. Since the mid-twentieth century, there has been general agreement that the systems have come unstuck. Yet older doctrinal formulations have lived on. Further intricacies have been added to already complicated doctrines. Vague doctrines have replaced rigid ones. The fundamental problem with nineteenth century contract theory has been sidestepped. Contract was defined in terms of the will of the parties. This theory could not explain why the parties are often bound by terms to which they did not consciously assent, and sometimes they are not bound by harsh terms to which they assented. Contemporary approaches either neglect the idea of fairness entirely or explain it through liberal considerations of choice. Foundations of American Contract Law systematically re-examines the major doctrines of American contract law. It presents an alternative approach that reconciles concerns about fairness, party autonomy, and the purposes that a contract serves for society and the parties themselves. It shows how this alternative better explains the enforceability of contracts, relief for unconscionable terms, the effect of mistake, fraud, duress and changed circumstances, and problems of assent, interpretation, good faith, and remedies for breach of contract.

The idea of cultural heritage as an 'international public good' can be traced back to the Preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, according to which "damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind". How this idea of cultural heritage as a global public good can be reconciled with the effective enforcement of protection norms is the subject of this study. Bringing together world experts in protecting cultural heritage, Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law examines the different ways that cultural heritage property can be protected, including protection at the international level, enforcement in domestic courts, and the role of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The book is divided into three sections. The first section assesses international law and analyses the interaction between international and domestic norms of public and private law. It discusses the different methods of international enforcement, the role of international and mixed criminal tribunals and courts, and the means for protecting cultural heritage in times of armed conflict. The second section addresses the role of national courts, discussing such topics as: barriers to domestic enforcement of international norms, the refusal to enforce foreign law, the difficulty of territorial boundaries in relation to underwater heritage, and the application of criminal sanctions by domestic courts. The final section of the book surveys alternatives to the legal enforcement of the norms protecting cultural heritage, including arbitration, soft law, and diplomacy.

The common law of England and the United States and the civil law of continental Europe have a similar doctrinal structure, a structure not found in the English cases or Roman legal texts from which they supposedly descend. In this original and unorthodox study of common law and legal philosophy the author throws light on the historical origins of this confusion and in doing so attempts to find answers to many of the philosophical puzzles which contract lawyers face today. Reassessing the impact of modern philosophy upon contract law, the author concludes that modern philosophy having failed to provide a new basis for a coherent doctrinal system in the law of contract, the only hope for devising such a coherent system lies in rediscovering the neglected philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas.

Professor James Gordley opens this volume with a concise history of the legal status of promises. In the central part of the book legal experts examine how twelve modern European legal systems deal with fifteen concrete situations in which a promise may not be enforceable--situations that include gifts, loans, bailments, houses, rewards, and brokerage contracts. Despite differences in legal doctrine, the volume reveals similarities in the results. This is the second completed project of The Common Core of European Private Law launched at the University of Trento.

The first twenty distinctions, translated here, comprise a treatise on law in general and contain a discussion of the nature of law, voluntary action, and the power of popes, bishops, and secular authorities. Accompanying the translation of the distinctions is a translation of the so-called ordinary gloss, a commentary on the distinctions that took its final form in the thirteenth century and was usually found around the margin texts of the 'Decretum.'

Foundations of Private Law is a treatise on the Western law of property, contract, tort and unjust enrichment in both common law systems and civil law systems. The thesis of the book is that underlying these fields of law are common principles, and that these principles can be used to explain the history and development of these areas. These underlying common principles are matters of common sense, which were given their archetypal expression by older jurists who wrote in the Aristotelian tradition. These principles shaped the development of Western law but can resolve legal problems which these older writers did not confront.

The book is an intellectual history of the work of Western jurists from ancient Rome to the present. It discusses the Roman jurists, the medieval civilians and canon lawyers, the late scholastics, the natural law schools of the 17th and 18th centuries, the positivism and conceptualism of the 19th century and its influence on common law, and the reaction against conceptualism since the late 19th century. Rarely have jurists worked alone. Rather, they have worked in schools, each of which pursued a different project. The projects of the jurists had one element in common: they were attempts to understand and explain the law. Commitment to that project defines the work of a jurist and distinguishes it from the work of others who take part in fashioning and applying the law. Yet the project of each school of jurists had goals and methods of its own. By identifying them, this study shows how the jurists themselves understood their work and how these goals and methods shaped and limited what each school could achieve.