Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict and peace in two important ways. First, it applies economic concepts and models to help one understand diverse conflict activities such as war, terrorism, genocide, and peace. Second, it treats coercive appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. In the second edition of their book Principles of Conflict Economics, Anderton and Carter provide comprehensive, up-to-date coverage of the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Along with new scholarship on well-established areas such as war, terrorism and alliances and under-researched areas including genocides, individual and family aspects of war, and conflict prevention, they apply new economic tools to the study of war and peace such as behavioral economics and economics of identity and offer deeper research and policy insights into how to reconstitute societies after large-scale violence.

Globalization and Armed Conflict addresses one of the most important and controversial issues of our time: Does global economic integration foster or suppress violent disputes within and between states? Here, cutting-edge research by leading figures in international relations shows that expanding commercial ties between states pacifies some, but not necessarily all, political relationships. The authors demonstrate that the pacific effect of economic integration hinges on democratic structures, the size of the global system, the nature of the trade goods, and a reduced influence of the military on political decisions. In sum, this book demonstrates how important the still fragile "capitalist peace" is.

The belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme throughout airpower theory and doctrine. Before World War I, dogmatic belief in the dominance of the offense in land warfare affected the military decisions which resulted in the disaster of the trenches. Termed the "cult of the offensive" by scholars, faith in offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed as irrelevant the numerous indications of the waning power of the offense as technological developments strengthened the defense. With airpower's professed inclination for offense, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences? The study begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force's air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offense are those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one's actively defended airspace. The relationship between offense and defense is dissected to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time, so traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. Next, the study describes those factors which may inject, or reinforce, a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. A cult of the offensive is defined as an organizational belief in the power of offense so compelling that the military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively. This leads to an examination of the ramifications postulated to result from offensive ideology.

Major Carter explores three case studies that have important similarities: the doctrine of Great Britain's Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force's strategy from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force's strategy from 1953 to 1965. He begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. He dissects the relationship between offense and defense to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time. He examines the nature of offense and defense as they apply to airpower and offers reasons military organization may prefer offensive doctrines. Major Carter identifies the elements and implications of the cult of the offensive.

Are you exhausted from working your way through the lists of "Best Things to See in Paris"? Have you wadded through mobs of tourists? Paid the substantial entry fees? Think you have explored all Paris offers? Twenty fascinating venues, both ancient and conremporary, await your discovery. If you are a fan of the strange, the slightly off-kilter or perhaps the downright wonderful and weird, delight in a whole new side to the City of Lights. Here are details of some the most novel, exceptional and unusual museums, restaurants and neighborhoods to enjoy in the world's most beloved capital: Paris Whether this is your first trip to Paris or your twenty-first, discover the offbeat Paris in Sights Less Seen: Paris.

The catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 (9/11) provide both challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign policy. As the war on terrorism continues, U.S.-China relations must be viewed through the lens of combating the terrorist threat. In "Implications of the U.S. War on Terrorism for U.S.-China Policy: A Strategic Window," the authors offer six proposals for U.S. policy vis-a-vis China in light of the war on terrorism. Each proposal stands on its own merits, providing a menu of graded options for policy makers to consider. The authors evaluate each proposal according to four criteria: organization and technical means required for implementation (shown as feasibility in the Proposal Evaluation Summary chart at the end of this summary), issues of U.S. domestic political support, issues of allied support, issues of China's perspective and provide an overall assessment. The individual criteria and the overall prospects for each proposal are graded as "straightforward," "challenging," or "difficult" to indicate the anticipated level of effort required in implementing the policy.

Dogmatic belief in the dominance of the land offensive influenced decisions that resulted in years of futile bloodletting on the Western Front in World War I. Termed "the cult of the offensive" by scholars of the Great War, faith in the offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed irrelevant numerous indications of its waning power in the face of technological developments favoring the defense. As we know, the belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme in airpower history and doctrine. Given the predilections of airmen for offensive operations, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences? By drawing on selected historical experiences of the air forces of Great Britain, Israel, and the United States, Maj. John R. Carter, Jr. employs a comparative perspective and rigorous case study methodology to offer a detailed examination of that question. He begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force's air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offense consists of those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one's own actively defended airspace. Major Carter dissects the relationship between offense and defense to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time. He thus concludes that traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. The author next describes those factors that may inject or reinforce a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. Major Carter defines a cult of the offensive as an organizational belief in the power of the offense so compelling that a military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively, which leads to his examination of the ramifications postulated to result from an offensive ideology. Drawing on the histories of three services - Great Britain's Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force from 1953 to 1965 - Major Carter offers three case studies to determine if the cult of the offensive applies to air forces. He concludes that cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpower doctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning and a critical evaluation of capabilities provide two methods for avoid this potential trap.

Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict and peace in two important ways. First, it applies economic concepts and models to help one understand diverse conflict activities such as war, terrorism, genocide, and peace. Second, it treats coercive appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. In the second edition of their book Principles of Conflict Economics, Anderton and Carter provide comprehensive, up-to-date coverage of the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Along with new scholarship on well-established areas such as war, terrorism and alliances and under-researched areas including genocides, individual and family aspects of war, and conflict prevention, they apply new economic tools to the study of war and peace such as behavioral economics and economics of identity and offer deeper research and policy insights into how to reconstitute societies after large-scale violence.