This classic collection of studies, first published in 1980, contributes to the revival of interest in the powers and duties of the American presidency. Unlike many previous books on the constitution and the president, the contributors to this volume are political scientists, not law professors. Accordingly, they display political scientists' concern with structures as well as power, with conflict between the branches of government as well as their functional separation, and with political prescription as well as legal analysis. Underlying the entire volume is a persistent attention to the nature of executive power and its particular manifestation in the American system. Part One introduces the foundations that underlie contemporary issues, including the famous James Madison-Alexander Hamilton debate over the powers of the presidency. Contemporary political and scholarly controversies, which are the subjects of Part Two, include the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the legislative veto, executive privilege and secrecy, the character of the presidency, presidential selection, and the nature of executive power. The essays in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order represent some of the most cogent thought available about the highest elected office in America, and the themes of the volume continue to be timely and provocative.

Time and again, in recent years, the charge has been made that sitting presidents have behaved "imperially," employing authorities that break the bounds of law and the Constitution. It is now an epithet used to describe presidencies of both parties. The Imperial Presidency and the Constitution examines this critical issue from a variety of perspectives: analyzing the president's role in the administrative state, as commander-in-chief, as occupant of the modern "Bully Pulpit," and, in separate essays, addressing recent presidents' relationship with Congress and the Supreme Court. The volume also deepens the discussion by taking a look back at Abraham Lincoln's expansive use of executive power during the Civil War where the tension between law and necessity were at their most extreme, calling into question the "rule of law" itself. The volume concludes with an examination of how the Constitution's provision of both "powers and duties" for the president can provide a roadmap for assessing the propriety of executive behavior.

This classic collection of studies, first published in 1980, contributes to the revival of interest in the powers and duties of the American presidency. Unlike many previous books on the constitution and the president, the contributors to this volume are political scientists, not law professors. Accordingly, they display political scientists' concern with structures as well as power, with conflict between the branches of government as well as their functional separation, and with political prescription as well as legal analysis. Underlying the entire volume is a persistent attention to the nature of executive power and its particular manifestation in the American system.

Part One introduces the foundations that underlie contemporary issues, including the famous James Madison-Alexander Hamilton debate over the powers of the presidency. Contemporary political and scholarly controversies, which are the subjects of Part Two, include the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the legislative veto, executive privilege and secrecy, the character of the presidency, presidential selection, and the nature of executive power.

The essays in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order represent some of the most cogent thought available about the highest elected office in America, and the themes of the volume continue to be timely and provocative.

In recent years, many Americans and more than a few political scientists have come to believe that democratic deliberation in Congress--whereby judgments are made on the merits of policies reflecting the interests and desires of American citizens--is more myth than reality. Rather, pressure from special interest groups, legislative bargaining, and the desire of incumbents to be reelected are thought to originate in American legislative politics. While not denying such influences, Joseph M. Bessette argues that the institutional framework created by the founding fathers continues to foster a government that is both democratic and deliberative, at least to some important degree.
Drawing on original research, case studies of policymaking in Congress, and portraits of American lawmakers, Bessette demonstrates not only the limitations of nondeliberative explanations for how laws are made but also the continued vitality of genuine reasoning on the merits of public policy. Bessette discusses the contributions of the executive branch to policy deliberation, and looks at the controversial issue of the proper relationship of public opinion to policymaking.
Informed by Bessette's nine years of public service in city and federal government, "The Mild Voice of Reason" offers important insights into the real workings of American democracy, articulates a set of standards by which to assess the workings of our governing institutions, and clarifies the forces that promote or inhibit the collective reasoning about common goals so necessary to the success of American democracy.
"No doubt the best-publicized recent book-length work on Congress is columnist George Will's diatribe in praise ofterm limits in which the core of his complaint is that Congress does not deliberate in its decision-making. Readers who are inclined to share that fantasy would do well to consult the work of Joseph M. Bessette. He turns up massive amounts of material attesting to the centrality of deliberation in congressional life."--Nelson W. Polsby, "Presidential Studies Quarterly"

Since 1981, when Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey K. Tulis first published "The Presidency in the Constitutional Order," the study of the constitutional powers of the presidency has advanced considerably. Bessette and Tulis continue the conversation almost 30 years later, presenting original research on the most significant issues regarding presidential power and the Constitution.

After introducing and identifying the main approaches to the study of the constitutional presidency and the nature of executive power, Bessette and Tulis, along with other constitutional scholars, cover a wide range of topics. These include the logic and meaning of Article II of the Constitution; the constitutional and political debate over Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793; the contribution of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft to the constitutional foundations of the modern presidency; the controversy over the presidential election of 2000 and the Supreme Court's decision in "Bush v. Gore"; military tribunals and the war on terrorism; executive orders; growing presidential influence over the budgeting process; executive privilege; impeachment; and demagoguery in democratic regimes.

The book conjoins political and legal modes of analysis and shows how constitutional interpretation is indispensable to an adequate description of political behavior and serves as the source of standards for evaluating presidential conduct. The contributors offer new and distinctive arguments, especially in light of the renewed debate over executive power during the George W. Bush administration.