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A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions
through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There
are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones.
Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create
institutions in orders to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so
in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the
institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required
behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing
mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the
resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally
efficient mechanisms. Our systematic design procedures are
algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most
of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are
finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a
Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make
that mechanism into an informationally efficient one.
Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also
studied.
One of the central questions of economics relates to the
coordination of individual units within a large organization to
achieve the central objectives of that organization. This book
examines the problems involved in allocating resources in an
economic system where decision-making is decentralized into the
hands of individuals and individual enterprises. The decisions made
by these economic agents must be coordinated because the input
decisions of some must eventually equal the output decisions of
others. Coordination arises naturally out of the mathematical
theory of optimization but there is still the question of how it
can be achieved in practice with dispersed knowledge. The essays
here explore the many facets of this problem. Nine papers are
grouped under the title 'Economies with a single maximand'. They
include papers on static and dynamic optimization, decentralization
within firms, and nonconvexities in optimizing problems. Fourteen
papers are concerned with 'Economies with multiple objectives'.
Among the topics covered here are stability of competitive
equilibrium, stability in oligopology, and dynamic shortages. The
final part of the book includes three papers on informational
efficiency and informationally decentralized systems. Leonid
Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The Sveriges Riksbank
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with
colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on the
effectiveness of markets.
Published as a tribute to the memory of Elisha Pazner, this book
contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of
the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms, written and
edited by the major contributors to the field. Amongst the topics
included are bargaining theory and the economics of competitive
bidding. The surveys are preceded by 'A Perspective', by Leo
Hurwicz which contains a systematic account of the development of
the literature on mechanism design, and this provides a context for
both the surveys and the six published papers authored or
co-authored by Elisha Pazner that complete the book and demonstrate
Pazner's interest in and contribution to the study of economic
mechanisms. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel, along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his
work on the effectiveness of markets.
Additional Contributing Authors Include Thomas Marschak, Robert
Solow, Samuel Karlin, And Others.
Additional Contributing Authors Include Thomas Marschak, Robert
Solow, Samuel Karlin, And Others.
One of the central questions of economics relates to the
coordination of individual units within a large organization to
achieve the central objectives of that organization. This book
examines the problems involved in allocating resources in an
economic system where decision-making is decentralized into the
hands of individuals and individual enterprises. The decisions made
by these economic agents must be coordinated because the input
decisions of some must eventually equal the output decisions of
others. Coordination arises naturally out of the mathematical
theory of optimization but there is still the question of how it
can be achieved in practice with dispersed knowledge. The essays
here explore the many facets of this problem. Nine papers are
grouped under the title 'Economies with a single maximand'. They
include papers on static and dynamic optimization, decentralization
within firms, and nonconvexities in optimizing problems. Fourteen
papers are concerned with 'Economies with multiple objectives'.
Among the topics covered here are stability of competitive
equilibrium, stability in oligopology, and dynamic shortages. The
final part of the book includes three papers on informational
efficiency and informationally decentralized systems. Leonid
Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The Sveriges Riksbank
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with
colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on the
effectiveness of markets.
Published as a tribute to the memory of Elisha Pazner, this book
contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of
the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms, written and
edited by the major contributors to the field. Amongst the topics
included are bargaining theory and the economics of competitive
bidding. The surveys are preceded by 'A Perspective', by Leo
Hurwicz which contains a systematic account of the development of
the literature on mechanism design, and this provides a context for
both the surveys and the six published papers authored or
co-authored by Elisha Pazner that complete the book and demonstrate
Pazner's interest in and contribution to the study of economic
mechanisms. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel, along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his
work on the effectiveness of markets.
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions
through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There
are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones.
Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create
institutions in orders to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so
in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the
institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required
behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing
mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the
resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally
efficient mechanisms. Our systematic design procedures are
algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most
of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are
finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a
Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make
that mechanism into an informationally efficient one.
Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also
studied.
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