This book is about the formative years of the first field marshal in the Corps of Royal Engineers, John Burgoyne, and his service in the Napoleonic Wars. Burgoyne's early service was in the Mediterranean, followed by service in the Iberian Peninsula from 1808-1814. Having built up a good relationship with Wellington, Burgoyne was selected to command the engineers in the disastrous American campaign of 1814-15. Burgoyne's father was also a well-known British general who, sadly, is remembered for his surrender of the British Army at Saratoga, rather than for more positive reasons. He died penniless, leaving his children, including John, to be cared for by family friends. Burgoyne seemed to spend the rest of his life working to obtain his independence. Like many engineers, Burgoyne kept detailed diaries, also writing comprehensive letters and analyses of his actions. These give contemporary knowledge of many notable events, particularly during the Peninsular War. His letters to fellow officers give an insight into the opinions and thoughts of an engineer officer, views which are often not visible in official communications. The main theme of the book is to show the development of a young officer during the Napoleonic Wars from an inexperienced subaltern through to someone who advised Wellington and his generals directly on military matters. His involvement with the senior officers in the army was not restricted to 'engineering' matters and he was trusted to carry out staff roles on many occasions. Burgoyne was present at many of the sieges and commanded at some. There is a wealth of unpublished information in his journals and letters. Burgoyne was highly critical of some of the sieges, even those that were considered successful. He was also critical of those where he commanded, particularly, Burgos in 1812. When Burgoyne was advising Raglan in the Crimea at the siege of Sevastopol, the failures at Burgos were used to undermine his position. The previous biography of Burgoyne by his son-in-law, George Wrottesley, was published nearly 150 years ago and is flawed in a number of ways. This new interpretation will help our understanding of this officer and present a different view on some of the key events during the Peninsular War. Wellington's Favourite Engineer includes a Foreword by Rory Muir.

In October 1810, the Third French invasion of Portugal under Marechal Massena arrived at the Lines of Torres Vedras and his triumphal march into Lisbon came to an abrupt halt. Five months later a thoroughly demoralised and defeated French army retreated from Portugal and never returned. The Lines played a vital role in enabling the allied army to operate against a more numerous enemy. When threatened, there was a safe place for the allies to retire to, and from this secure base, Wellington eventually liberated the Iberian Peninsula. France, Portugal and Britain developed plans for the defence of Lisbon in 1808 and 1809. In November 1809, the British proposal was commenced and became the Lines of Torres Vedras. The Memorandum on the construction was written in October 1809 but was more of an outline. The design and construction was completed over the next 18 months, the bulk being completed before the arrival of the French in October 1810. The initial design was expanded through 1810 as more time became available and the construction in October 1810 was significantly different to the original memorandum. The book takes the reader through events in 1809 that led to the need for the construction of defences. The construction work is detailed and illustrated through several maps to explain the position and purpose of the several defences. The French invasion of 1810 is summarised through to the time when the French arrived at the Lines. The operations and movements over the next month are again detailed along with the continuing construction work on the Lines. One of the unusual elements of the defences was the construction of a telegraph system and this is described in great detail. One of the lesser-known facts about the Lines, is the position of the opposing forces between October 1810 and March 1811. They were only facing each other at the Lines for a few weeks during this period and most French troops never approached them. The operations and defences were spread over a much larger area. This book uses many new sources to prove a new, in-depth, English language account of the massive engineering exercise that built the Lines with the help of thousands of Portuguese civilians. Without the construction of the Lines, it is likely that Portugal would have been lost and history would tell a very different story.