"Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics" explores the foundations of early utilitarianism as well as the theoretical basis of social ethics and policy in modern Western welfare states. Matti Hayry shows how philosophers have misunderstood the very nature of utilitarianism since the turn of the 19th century and identifies the resulting problems in contemporary utilitarianism.
Hayry argues that when the classical utilitarian principles of happiness, hedonism and impartiality are combined, the ensuing ethical theory may demand that we act immorally or unjustly. This is because the scope of the utilitarian theory has been extended too far. Hayry develops a more limited utilitarian theory based on the ethos of early British universal altruism. He argues that a limited version of liberal utilitarianism and the methods of applied ethics should be employed to define our moral duties and rights. This is an important book in current discussions on social ethics and policy. Hayry's accomplished defense of utilitarian morality is certain to provoke debate.

Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics explores the foundations of early utilitarianism and, at the same time, the theoretical bases of social ethics and policy in modern Western welfare states. Matti Hayry sees the main reason for utilitarianism's growing disrepute among moral philosophers is that its principles cannot legitimately be extended to situations where the basic needs of the individuals involved are in conflict. He is able to formulate a solution to this fundamental problem by arguing convincingly that by combining a limited version of liberal utilitarianism and the methods of applied ethics, we are able to define our moral duties and rights. Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics will appeal to students and teachers of philosophy who are interested in the doctrine of utilitarianism or in ethical decison-making.

The Medical Biobank of Umea in Sweden, deCODE's Health Sector Database in Iceland, the Estonian Genome Project and the UK Biobank contain health data and genetic data from large populations. Some include genealogical or lifestyle information. They are resources for research in human genetics and medicine, exploring interaction between genes, lifestyle, environmental factors and health and diseases. The collection, storage and use of this data raise ethical, legal and social issues. In this book, first published in 2007, bioethics scholars examine whether existing ethical frameworks and social policies reflect people's concerns, and how they may need to change in light of new scientific and technological developments. The ethical issues of social justice, genetic discrimination, informational privacy, trust in science and consent to participation in database research are analyzed, whilst an empirical survey, conducted in the four countries, demonstrates public views of privacy and related moral values in the context of human genetic databases.

This Element traces the origins and development of bioethics, the principles and values involved in the discipline, and the roles of justice among these principles and values. The main tasks given to the concept of justice have since the late 1970s been nondiscrimination in research, prioritization in medical practice, and redistribution in healthcare. The Element argues that in a world challenged by planet-wide political and environmental threats this is not sufficient. The nature and meaning of justice has to be rethought. The Element does this by dissecting current bioethical approaches in the light of theories of justice as partly clashing interpretations of equality. The overall findings are twofold. Seen against the background of global concerns, justice in bioethics has become a silent guardian of economic sustainability. Seen against the same background, we should set our aims higher. Justice can, and must, be put to better use than it presently is. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The Medical Biobank of Umea in Sweden, deCODE's Health Sector Database in Iceland, the Estonian Genome Project and the UK Biobank contain health data and genetic data from large populations. Some include genealogical or lifestyle information. They are resources for research in human genetics and medicine, exploring interaction between genes, lifestyle, environmental factors and health and diseases. The collection, storage and use of this data raise ethical, legal and social issues. In this book, first published in 2007, bioethics scholars examine whether existing ethical frameworks and social policies reflect people's concerns, and how they may need to change in light of new scientific and technological developments. The ethical issues of social justice, genetic discrimination, informational privacy, trust in science and consent to participation in database research are analyzed, whilst an empirical survey, conducted in the four countries, demonstrates public views of privacy and related moral values in the context of human genetic databases.

Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? Matti Hayry asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, Jurgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, Matti Hayry argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken.

Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? Matti H yry asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, J rgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, Matti H yry argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken.