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This work is a contemporary chronicle of the Cold War and offers an
analysis of policy and rhetoric of the United States and Soviet
Union during the 1980s. The authors examine the assumptions that
drove political decisions and the rhetoric that defined the
relationship as the Soviet Union began to implode. This work
demonstrates that while the subsequent unraveling of the Soviet
empire was an unintended side effect of Mikhail Gorbachev's
reforms, termination of the Cold War was not. Ronald Reagan
deserves full credit for recognizing Gorbachev's sincerity and his
determination to change the direction of Soviet policies. For this,
Reagan felt the full wrath of anticommunist hawks for "doing
business" with a communist leader. But it was Gorbachev who
concluded the superpowers had become "mesmerized by ideological
myths" which ruled out any meaningful discussions of a possible
accommodation of political issues for more than four decades. The
evidence is compelling that Gorbachev himself broke the Cold War's
ideological straight jacket that had paralyzed Moscow and
Washington's ability to resolve their differences. Though
politically weakened, Gorbachev conceded nothing to U.S. military
superiority. Never did he negotiate from a position of weakness. In
doing so, the last Soviet leader faced even greater political and
physical risk. Without Gorbachev the end of the Cold War could have
played out very differently and perhaps with great danger.
This concise diplomatic history of the Confederation era is the
first new work on the topic in a generation. In its pages, three
distinguished diplomatic historians offer a realist interpretation
of the way in which the Founding Fathers conducted foreign affairs,
refreshing our collective memory about their priorities and their
values. When three of the nation's leading historians come together
to fashion a fresh study of American history, the resulting work
cannot help but be a monumental addition to the field. Foreign
Affairs and the Founding Fathers: From Confederation to
Constitution, 1776-1787 is such a work. These eminent scholars
provide a thoughtful, realist interpretation of the Founders' view
of America's place in the world, delivering a timely reassessment
of their aspirations, thoughts, and actions during the seminal
decades of the American nation. This book takes readers backstage
where they can eavesdrop on the Founders to better understand their
motives and intentions and see how they responded to threats and
problems associated with America's place in the world. Arguing that
the Founding Fathers essentially thought and acted in terms of
power-ranking matters of national interest and security over
ideology and moral concerns-the book sheds new light on the foreign
policy opportunities and challenges of the day, as the Founders
weighed and determined them. In so doing, it offers important
guideposts for our own time. Two maps relative to the Confederation
period A bibliography
As the first of a trilogy of works on American diplomacy, this
volume studies the task of diplomacy in achieving communication and
dialogue among nations of widely divergent cultures and values.
This study, a realist interpretation of the long diplomatic record
that produced the coming of World War II in 1939, is a critique of
the Paris Peace Conference and reflects the judgment shared by many
who left the Conference in 1919 in disgust amid predictions of
future war. The critique is a rejection of the idea of collective
security, which Woodrow Wilson and many others believed was a
panacea, but which was also condemned as early as 1915. This book
delivers a powerful lesson in treaty-making and rejects the
supposition that treaties, once made, are unchangeable, whatever
their faults.
This study, a realist interpretation of the long diplomatic record
that produced the coming of World War II in 1939, is a critique of
the Paris Peace Conference and reflects the judgment shared by many
who left the Conference in 1919 in disgust amid predictions of
future war. The critique is a rejection of the idea of collective
security, which Woodrow Wilson and many others believed was a
panacea, but which was also condemned as early as 1915. This book
delivers a powerful lesson in treaty-making and rejects the
supposition that treaties, once made, are unchangeable, whatever
their faults.
Based on a conference at West Point, this volume explores the
national security policies developed by the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations in response to the threat of Soviet expansionism.
More pointed and analytic than any other book on the subject, it
shows clearly that the makers of Cold War policy were motivated by
fear. It also examines the nature of U.S. security policy and
points to the growing gap between the ends and the means of global
security policy--the goal of protecting Western democracy from the
"Red Menace" by using a nuclear strategy with limited applications.
The contributors, including David Alan Rosenberg, Lloyd C. Gardner,
Martin J. Sherwin, and Gary W. Reichard explore such issues as how
dependence on nuclear weapons became the central doctrine of
American foreign policy, the bureaucratic and political context of
U.S. security, Eisenhower's ongoing disputes with Army and Navy
leaders over the security issue, the objections of Democrats to the
evolving security strategy, and the limits of Cold War policy,
particularly how the viewing of the Third World through a
U.S.-Soviet prism impeded us from developing a truly global
security policy. Written in an accessible, journalistic style, The
National Security makes available a wealth of information on the
Cold War period and offers insights into fears that dominate
political thinking to this day.
Contributing Authors Staughton Lynd, James B. Reston, Richard W.
Van Alstyne, And Others. Problems In European Civilization.
This work is a contemporary chronicle of the Cold War and offers an
analysis of policy and rhetoric of the United States and Soviet
Union during the 1980s. The authors examine the assumptions that
drove political decisions and the rhetoric that defined the
relationship as the Soviet Union began to implode. This work
demonstrates that while the subsequent unraveling of the Soviet
empire was an unintended side effect of Mikhail Gorbachev's
reforms, termination of the Cold War was not. Ronald Reagan
deserves full credit for recognizing Gorbachev's sincerity and his
determination to change the direction of Soviet policies. For this,
Reagan felt the full wrath of anticommunist hawks for doing
business with a communist leader. But it was Gorbachev who
concluded the superpowers had become mesmerized by ideological
myths which ruled out any meaningful discussions of a possible
accommodation of political issues for more than four decades. The
evidence is compelling that Gorbachev himself broke the Cold War's
ideological straight jacket that had paralyzed Moscow and
Washington's ability to resolve their differences. Though
politically weakened, Gorbachev conceded nothing to U.S. military
superiority. Never did he negotiate from a position of weakness. In
doing so, the last Soviet leader faced even greater political and
physical risk. Without Gorbachev the end of the Cold War could have
played out very differently and perhaps with great danger.
Three distinguished diplomatic historians offer an assessment of
the Cold War in the realist tradition that focuses on balancing the
objectives of foreign policy with the means of accomplishing them.
America and the Cold War, 1941–1991: A Realist Interpretation is
a sweeping historical account that focuses on the policy
differences at the center of this conflict. In its pages, three
preeminent authors offer an examination of contemporary criticism
of the Cold War, documenting the views of observers who appreciated
that many policies of the period were not only dangerous, but could
not resolve the problems they contemplated. The study offers a
comprehensive chronicle of U.S.-Soviet relations, broadly
conceived, from World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It places the origins of the Cold War as related to the contentious
issues of World War II and stresses the failure of Washington to
understand or seriously seek settlement of those issues. It points
out how nuclear weaponry gradually assumed political stature and
came to dominate high-level, Soviet-American diplomatic activity,
at the same time discounting the notion that the Cold War was a
global ideological confrontation for the future of civilization. A
concluding chapter draws lessons from the Cold War decades, showing
how they apply to dealing with nation-states and terrorist groups
today.
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