This book is a full inquiry into the likely size and sophistication of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. It attempts to reconstruct the history of Israel's development of atomic weaponry and to define the probable characteristics of Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Israel's Nuclear Arsenal is a full inquiry into the likely size and sophistication of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. Among the key questions it addresses are: Did other nations-the United States, France, or West Germany, for example-assist Israel in developing its nuclear weapons capacity? What is the nature of Israel's industrial nuclear infrastructure? What are the design, number, and yield of its atomic bombs? How are they deliverable? The answers to these queries are important: Israel's nuclear capability is one of the most potentially critical, and least discussed, variables on the world scene today. By providing the most comprehensive and in-depth investigation to date of Israel's atomic military strength, Pry lays the foundation for analyzing Israeli strategic options and the A-bomb's potential to contribute to international stability or instability, war or peace. This book establishes a new basis from which debate over the political and strategic significance of Israeli nuclear arms can proceed.

Why do some American intelligence officials maintain fallout shelters and private contingency plans to evacuate their families in the event of a Russian nuclear strike--even in today's post-Cold War era of U.S.-Russian partnership? The frightening answer lies within the pages of "War Scare," a terrifying assessment of the prospect for nuclear holocaust in our day. Written by Peter Vincent Pry, a former CIA military analyst, "War Scare" provides a history of our country's little-known brushes with nuclear war and warns that, contrary to popular opinion and the assurances of our political leaders, the possibility of a Russian attack still exists. Nuclear deterrence has been the foundation of Western security for the last 50 years, but since the end of the Cold War, Russian military doctrine has become more destabilizing, and much more dangerous, than is commonly believed.

By making use of a wealth of declassified and unclassified material, Dr. Pry illustrates how Russia's brutal past continues to shape the consciousness and decision making of its leaders, many of whom are unreconstructed ideologues from the old Soviet regime. Gripped by a perpetual perception of imminent threat--a war scare--the Russian General Staff, which controls the technical capability of launching a nuclear strike, has shown itself to be unstable at best. The author explores recent history and near-disasters such as the Bosnian crisis, the Norway missile incident, and U.S. air strikes on Iraq from the perspective of the Russian General Staff, believing that only by understanding their viewpoint can we minimize the risk of unintentionally provoking a deadly attack. Wary of NATO expansion and reeling from the Russian economy's descent into chaos, the General Staff may interpret Western military exercises and operations in the Middle East and elsewhere as concealing surprise aggression against Russia. This is a grave situation, indeed, as even after the START I, II, and III agreements, Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world--not to mention significantly expanded chemical and biological warfare capability. "War Scare" convincingly shows that we ignore these facts at our peril.

The fourth volume of the Center for Security Policy's National Security Policy Proceedings includes transcripts of remarks by Tevi Troy, Tom Donnelly, Peter Pry, Peter Brookes, Lisa Curtis, and David J. Trachtenberg. It contains book reviews by Samara Greenberg, Kyle Shideler, and Christopher Holton.