The Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Center for Strategic and International Studies joined to launch the New Approaches to the Fuel Cycle project. This project sought to build consensus on common goals, address practical challenges, and engage a spectrum of actors that influence policymaking regarding the nuclear fuel cycle. The project also tackled one of the toughest issues-spent nuclear fuel and high level waste-to see if solutions there might offer incentives to states on the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle and address the inherent inertia and concerns about additional burdens and restrictions that have stalled past efforts to improve the robustness of the nonproliferation regime. This report presents the group's conclusions that a best-practices approach to the nuclear fuel cycle can achieve these objectives and offer a path to a more secure and sustainable nuclear landscape.

After several decades of decline and disfavour, nuclear power is attracting renewed interest. New permit applications for 30 reactors have been filed in the United States, and another 150 are planned or proposed globally, with about a dozen more already under construction. In the United States, interest appears driven, in part, by provisions in the 2005 Energy Policy Act authorising streamlined licensing that combine construction and operating permits, and tax credits for production from advanced nuclear power facilities. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Energy proposes to spend billions of dollars to develop the next generation of nuclear power technology.

Non-proliferation assistance programs are a relatively new tool in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these programs. Begun in 1991, CTR initially aimed to help Russia meet its START obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons; 1. Within a decade, however, CTR took on the goal of reducing the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 2. Experts realised that Russia needed to protect its Cold War overhang of WMD materials, scientists, and equipment from those who might exploit insider opportunities and who had incentives (particularly financial) to sell WMD technology to anyone. Now, however, many analysts support expanding co-operative threat reduction programs beyond Russia to other geographic areas. The Bush Administration itself stated in early 2003, that it had 'expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program' to support the war on terrorism. This book surveys options for applying CTR programs to states that pose a WMD and terrorism threat.

Non-proliferation assistance programs, including co-operative threat reduction, are being examined to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorisation Act, Congress authorised the Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. This book analyses the range of possibilities for applying CTR funds, what kinds of assistance may be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance. A key underlying issue is whether countries that pose particular risks are prepared to provide adequate co-operation to achieve CTR objectives. As many observers have noted, CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries. A common factor must be the willingness of such states to co-operate. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus additionally on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.

As part of the global Governing Uranium Project headed by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzed U.S. experiences with the security of its "front-end" uranium industry. This report examines current U.S. regulation and industry practices regarding security measures and controls over natural uranium prior to enrichment. Topics include prudent management practices, export-import controls, transportation, physical protection, and material accounting. The report highlights security analysis on uranium mining, milling, and conversion, which have historically enjoyed less proliferation scrutiny than other components of the nuclear fuel cycle.