The law-and-economics movement remains a dominant force in American private law, even though courts and commentators recognize that many of its assumptions are implausible and that efficiency is not the law's only goal. This book adds to the debate by showing that many leading law-and-economics arguments fail on their own terms, even for those who accept their most important assumptions and goals. Adopting an analytical approach and using some law-and-economics methods against the leading arguments in that field, Shawn Bayern shows that economic thinking fails to explain or justify most rules in the common law. Bayern masterfully surveys leading law-and-economics arguments in tort, contract, and property law and shows them to be fragile, self-contradictory, or otherwise problematic. Those who accept that efficiency is important should not be persuaded by the kind of law-and-economics arguments that have remained in vogue among legal scholars for decades.

The law-and-economics movement remains a dominant force in American private law, even though courts and commentators recognize that many of its assumptions are implausible and that efficiency is not the law's only goal. This book adds to the debate by showing that many leading law-and-economics arguments fail on their own terms, even for those who accept their most important assumptions and goals. Adopting an analytical approach and using some law-and-economics methods against the leading arguments in that field, Shawn Bayern shows that economic thinking fails to explain or justify most rules in the common law. Bayern masterfully surveys leading law-and-economics arguments in tort, contract, and property law and shows them to be fragile, self-contradictory, or otherwise problematic. Those who accept that efficiency is important should not be persuaded by the kind of law-and-economics arguments that have remained in vogue among legal scholars for decades.

Under current business law, it is already possible to give legal personhood, or a very close surrogate of it, to software systems of any kind (from a simple automated escrow agent to a more hypothetical, truly smart artificial intelligence). This means that, for example, robots could enter into contracts, serve as legal agents, or own property. Ultimately, entire companies could actually be run by non-human agents. This study argues that this is not as scary as it might sound at first. Legal theorist and noted software developer Shawn Bayern argues that autonomous or zero-person organizations offer an opportunity for useful new types of interactions between software and the law. This creative contribution to the theory and practice of law and technology explores the social and political aspects of these new organizational structures and their implications for legal theory.

Under current business law, it is already possible to give legal personhood, or a very close surrogate of it, to software systems of any kind (from a simple automated escrow agent to a more hypothetical, truly smart artificial intelligence). This means that, for example, robots could enter into contracts, serve as legal agents, or own property. Ultimately, entire companies could actually be run by non-human agents. This study argues that this is not as scary as it might sound at first. Legal theorist and noted software developer Shawn Bayern argues that autonomous or zero-person organizations offer an opportunity for useful new types of interactions between software and the law. This creative contribution to the theory and practice of law and technology explores the social and political aspects of these new organizational structures and their implications for legal theory.