The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 and is a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, stimulate, and challenge readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, timeliness, and usefulness and interest to a wide readership. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Navy Department or the Naval War College.

Not all commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), or enlisted Soldiers assigned to United States Army Reserve (USAR) civil affairs (CA) units possess skills or qualifications equivalent to those commonly associated with functional specialty areas. USAR CA functional specialty cells train to provide expertise in political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems, based on professional civilian skills, to designated countries within a geographical area. USAR CA functional specialists must be highly skilled, technically proficient, and experienced individuals focused on fundamental civil authority functions. The purpose of this monograph is to present a rational response to an enduring query regarding the staffing and training of functional specialists. The intent of this monograph is not to revise current doctrine or resolve any subjective discourse between the Active Army or USAR CA communities regarding force structure or missions. This monograph identifies and examines the strengths and weaknesses of functional specialty cells by nesting functional specialty areas with core CA tasks during historical military operations since World War II. The primary focus will be on the effectiveness of staffing, training, and employing functional specialty cells to support civil-military operations (CMO) conducted during full-spectrum operations (FSO) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. The conclusion of this monograph offers plausible recommendations for improving the quality, quantity, and effectiveness of functional specialists in order to increase the effectiveness of USAR CA units in an operational force.