In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

Charting the evolution of Britain's leading role in the formation of NATO, the book provides a balanced assessment of British foreign and defence policies as the Cold War gathered momentum and a new system of European security was forged in the aftermath of World War II. The author argues that, despite the obvious differences between the periods, there are important lessons to be learned from post-war diplomacy by today's statesmen as they struggle to build another system of European security in the post-Cold War era. The book is based on a wide range of British, American and Canadian archives. Other published works by the author include "British Defence Policy in a Changing World", "Soviet Strategy" (with G. Segal), "Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy", "Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-84", "Contemporary Strategy Vols I and II" (with G. Segal, J. Garnett and P. Williams), "Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace" (with G. Segal, E. Moreton and L. Freedman), "Britain, NATO and Nuclear Weapons" (with K. Booth), "British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance", "Makers of Nuclear Strategy" (with J. Garnett) and "Dilemmas of World Politics" (with N. Rengger).

In the desperate summer of 1942, Hitler seemed to be on the verge of victory in Russia and the Middle East. With Rommel nearing Cairo, a little known lieutenant-general, Bernard Montgomery, took charge of what Churchill called a "baffled and bewildered" British 8th Army. Assuming command, Montgomery issued his famous order, "Here we will stand and fight;...If we can't stay here alive, then let us stay here dead," and led the Army to one of the Allies' greatest victories--El Alamein. "Monty" became an instantly recognizable Allied leader, but as a man with strong views, unbending principles, and outspoken frankness, he was both loved and disliked, praised and criticized. This bibliography presents and evaluates the extensive body of literature that has grown up around the controversial Field Marshal. Any serious study of World War II military campaigns must confront Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, an individualist with both admirers and detractors. This book provides an extensive historiographical overview of the literature in Part I and a bibliography of significant works in Part II. It is a basic reference and research guide for the student, scholar, and general reader.

Providing an invaluable introductory resource for students studying cyber warfare, this book highlights the evolution of cyber conflict in modern times through dozens of key primary source documents related to its development and implementation. This meticulously curated primary source collection is designed to offer a broad examination of key documents related to cyber warfare, covering the subject from multiple perspectives. The earliest documents date from the late 20th century, when the concept and possibility of cyber attacks became a reality, while the most recent documents are from 2019. Each document is accompanied by an introduction and analysis written by an expert in the field that provides the necessary context for readers to learn about the complexities of cyber warfare. The title's nearly 100 documents are drawn primarily but not exclusively from government sources and allow readers to understand how policy, strategy, doctrine, and tactics of cyber warfare are created and devised, particularly in the United States. Although the U.S. is the global leader in cyber capabilities and is largely driving the determination of norms within the cyber domain, the title additionally contains a small number of international documents. This invaluable work will serve as an excellent starting point for anyone seeking to understand the nature and character of international cyber warfare. Covers in detail one of the defining forms of conflict of the 21st century-cyber warfare will significantly impact virtually every American citizen over the next two decades Provides more than 90 primary source documents and matching analysis, allowing readers to investigate the underpinnings of cyber warfare Enables readers to see the development of different concepts of cyber warfare through its chronological organization Reflects the deep knowledge of an editor who is a noted expert in cyber warfare and has taught for the United States Air Force for more than a decade

The relationship of the United States and Great Britain has been the subject of numerous studies with a particular emphasis on the idea of a "special relationship" based on traditional common ties of language, history, and political affinity. Although certainly special, Anglo-American cooperation arose from mutual necessity. Soybel examines the "special relationship" through a new lens--that of the most intimate of wartime collaborations, the naval intelligence relationship. Rather than looking at the uses of intelligence and espionage, Soybel explores how the cooperation was established and maintained, particularly through the creation of administrative bureaucracies, as well as how World War I and pre-war efforts helped pave the way towards wartime cooperation. The development of the wartime cooperation in naval intelligence between 1939 and 1943 highlights the best and worst of the alliance and shows both its advantages and its limitations. It demonstrates that the Anglo-American partnership during World War II was a necessary one, and its intimacy demanded by the exigencies of the total war then being fought. Its problems were the result of traditional conflicts based on economics, imperial concerns, and national interests. Its successes found their bases in individual partnerships formed during the war, not in the overall one given mythical status by men like Winston Churchill. While still giving credit to the unique alliance that has survived in the last fifty years, this study shows that the close ties were necessary, not special.

The threat to use military force is a matter that commands immediate attention from many segments of government. Karsten, Howell, and Allen systematically analyze statistically significant numbers of actual cases to discover the determinants of success or failure of the threat to employ military force. After describing their methodology, they address several questions: what are the general characteristics of the typical threat? what types of threats succeed? what threats lead to war? did threats in the prenuclear past differ in outcome from those in the nuclear present? have the United States' threats differed substantially from those of other nations? can anything be said concerning the long-term consequences of the threats? In a concluding chapter the authors summarize their findings, compare them to the conventional wisdom, and then, as a test, apply them to six historical cases. They end their study with a look at the Solidarity and Falklands crises, and a theoretical scenario that suggests the significance of their findings.

This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a collection of vignettes written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerrillas. The material was originally collected and published by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College to serve as a text on combat against a guerrilla force in mountain-desert terrain. It was originally intended for internal use only and as such provides examples of both good and bad military practice. The hard lessons learned are not specifically 'Russian' in nature and many of the same mistakes and successes would apply equally to the American Army in Vietnam. Indeed, the knowledge gained from these reports should also apply to future conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rugged terrain.
This is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, but rather a series of snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers. It is an intimate look at the boring, brutal business of counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror.
Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

This updated edition of Professor Paul Moorcraft s timely and controversial book examines the international and domestic threats to the West from Jihadism. It joins the dots in the Middle East, Asia and Africa and explains what it means for the home front, mainly Britain but also continental Europe and the USA. More Brits are trying to join the Islamic State than the reserve forces. Why? It puts the whole complex jigsaw together without pulling any punches. After briefly tracing the origins of Jihadism from the time of the Prophet, The Jihadist Threat analyses the fall-out from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and how far these fuelled the rise of the self-styled Islamic State and other terror groups and the extent these pose to European society. Finally, the Author offers suggestions for defeating this existential threat to the Western way of life. This well-illustrated book is written from the inside. Professor Moorcraft, currently the Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, London, has long worked at the heart of the British security establishment and has operated as a war correspondent in over thirty conflict zones since Afghanistan in the 1980s, often alongside frontline Jihadists. Arguably no-one is better qualified to write on this subject and his knowledge coupled with forthright views cannot be ignored. This claim is borne out by his predictions in the original edition which have proved prescient. This is an important work that fully deserves the acclaim it has attracted.

From 1918 to 1939 one issue dominated French foreign and defence policy: the German problem. This work outlines France's strategies for protection and appeasement during this period and places inter-war relations in a larger European context. With contributions from scholars in the field, it examines: relationships with key countries such as Italy and Russia; the significance of inter-war France to 20th-century European integration; the historical context of the policies; and the setbacks and defeats of the period and how they should be evaluated.

This work contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. After an analysis of existing literature on this subject and a discussion of case studies, Rear Admiral Menon develops the argument that those navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to the overall political objectives. Government neglect, inadequate funding and structures that are more appropriate to purely maritime wars are symptomatic of a universal strategic dilemma that arises from inadequate strategic theory.

Menon argues that current technological trends are likely to lead to fleets re-exerting their lost superiority against land-based means of conducting warfare, so long as the navies involved rebuild their structures to speed up the battle, since faster battle is the current strategic trend. Littoral superiority then becomes a naval objective on which to construct joint warfare.

In the immediate post-World War II period, Army aviation began to evolve from an observatory role to a mobility role. Helicopter air mobility began to develop in the Army from 1949 onwards. The outbreak of the Korean war assisted and accelerated the acceptance of greater helicopter air mobility within the Army. The Eisenhower period was a golden age for Army aviation, with rapid and extensive developments in air mobility doctrine and tactics. There was also a strong research and development effort to overcome the initial technological lag. These developments allowed the formation of the first air mobile division in 1965 to meet the growing demands of the Vietnam war. This work gives a new understanding of the process of military innovation. Moreover, this case study has important general implications for future military policy-making.

Why did NATO expand its membership during the Cold War years, and what was its attraction to new members? This book locates the answers to these questions not solely in the Cold War, but in the historical problems of international order in Europe and the growing idea of the West. A wide range of sources is used, and the analysis looks at a process of neo-enlargement during NATO's inception as well as the formal accessions that followed.

An extraordinary tale, much-neglected by historians, of courage, bravery and eventual tragedy which took place during the First World War in the Middle East. It is the story of a small group of people, of whom Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn were the core, who were devoted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, and who were convinced that it was in imminent danger of extinction from the Turks.They resolved to help the British in Egypt by collecting military intelligence. Unfortunately, as Peter Calvocoressi points out, their understanding of the British position was quite wrong...[their] miscalculations created the tragedy which this book recounts...'

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

Knowledge is the basic output of the defense technology establishment in the United States; it is what enables the development of weapon systems. From this premise, this volume explores the process of knowledge production in defense technology from the beginnings of the Cold War to the present time. Produced through the process of research and development (R&D), technical knowledge for defense is an economic commodity. It is "fundable" in the sense of having future value. Like other commodities in the futures market, it is purchased before it is produced. But unlike those other commodities, this knowledge is typically produced through the joint efforts of the customer and the vendor.
This study highlights two polar aspects of knowledge production: technology development and technology transfer. It centers on the present, shifting concept of defense conversion that is redefining defense technology policy. The book also includes cited documents pertaining to the transactions that engage customers and vendors in the process of knowledge production. The documents constitute a literature of needs and claims, and they reveal two chief properties: problem formulation and tactical positioning. Apart from the substantive yield of these particular documents, the strategy of evidence in this volume has broad implications for further study, suggesting a means of analyzing knowledge production in other large social systems.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

This book describes, for the first time, allied contingency plans for military operations in the Middle East, in the event of a global conflict with the Soviet Union. It argues that the diplomatic events and crises in the Middle East during the first decade after World War Two can be understood only in the context of the military and strategic assets sought by the allies in that region, in view of the perceived Soviet threat. Professor Cohen synthesises military and diplomatic thought during the crucial decade after World War Two and thus brings a new, comprehensive understanding of the major events of this decade; the Truman Doctrine; the protracted Anglo-Egyptian crisis; the first Arab-Israeli war; the Tripartite Declaration; and the formation of the Baghdad Pact. This valuable study places events in the Middle East within the wider context of the global geo-strategic balance, and the decline of British power. It records also the reluctance of the United States to do what eventually became inevitable - to take over Britain's traditional hegemony in the near and Middle East.

By comparison with the other facets of intelligence, the analytical role provided by intelligence agencies has not received the scholarly attention that it rightly deserves. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays comprising it may be divided into four self-contained sets of essays. The first critically examines the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. Each is written by someone who participated at a senior level and hence knows their respective strengths and weaknesses well. The second series of essays looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. While two specifically examine how well intelligence producers have related to their political masters, another dissects the internal relationships that have developed between CIA analysts and their managers. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Here such new analytical priorities as the environment, peacekeeping and arms proliferation are singled out for study. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.

This book examines the viability of non-provocative defence - the controversial idea that defensive military policies and practices reduce the risk of wars and provide a viable basis for defending a society should war break out. Drawing on case studies from Europe, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Asia-Pacific, the author concludes that non-provocative defence concepts remain relevant and that they can help in deterring, conducting, and settling wars.

The development of a European security architecture comprising NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE is covered in this book, providing a critical account of the re-projection, and redefinition of western values and institutions, in the post-Cold War era. This transformation is explored in three stages. The first stage covers the period 1990 to 1991, and explains the preservation of a "western security community" inherited from the Cold War, through a process of institutional reconstruction, largely carried out on paper. The second stage from 1991 to 1992 sees the incorporation of a "purpose" for these institutions as a framework for the implementation of collective security. The third stage explores the emerging questions of legitimacy surrounding the new tasks of these institutions.

In From Flintlock to Rifle, Professor Ross traces the development of infantry tactics from the mid-eighteenth century, when infantry fought in rigid linear formations, until the second half of the nineteenth century, by which time infantrymen with rifled weapons were learning to advance in open order and use aimed fire. The author demonstrates that this transition in tactics involved social and technological change as well as military innovation. Old Regime armies, recruited from a narrow social base and armed with slow-firing, short-range, inaccurate weapons, relied upon harsh discipline and formalized evolutions to attain tactical proficiency. When the French Royal Army collapsed it was replaced with a mass citizen army. This contained elements of the old tactical system but placed a new emphasis on mobility, flexibility, and individual initiative. Napoleon's rivals either imitated aspects of the French system or sought to copy the spirit of the new tactics, engineering social reforms from above and creating their own citizen armies. After 1815, generals and politicians continued to develop tactical doctrines that embodied the lessons of the Napoleonic wars. Industrialization had a swift impact on weapons technology and firearms improved in range, accuracy, and rate of fire. As a result, military men had to modify their drill and battle tactics to cope with increased firepower. A process initiated by the French Revolution was thus accelerated by the Industrial Revolution.

This book analyses Japan's security policy after the Cold War and engages with the question of whether, since the Cold War ended, Japan has again become a global security player. The contributions to the book explore Japan's security policy by providing a detailed overview of the evolution of Japan's security policy after the Cold War, including the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands dispute. It also reveals the preeminent security concerns of contemporary Japan by delving into regional security issues such as the Layered Security of Okinawa, the increasing nuclear threat from North Korea, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-6. The book culminates by discussing security in terms of the essential functions of energy, food, and human security, including an assessment of Japan's energy policy since World War II and an assessment of the impact food security on Japan's agriculture and trade. This book will be of interest to student and scholars of East Asian Politics, Security Studies and the International Relations of the Asia Pacific. It is also a valuable resource for diplomats and policymakers on Japan and East Asia.