Strategy promises to turn the use of force into an instrument of
policy. This book explores how military operations undertaken by
European armed forces are intended to deliver political effects.
Drawing on the work of Carl von Clausewitz it argues that strategy
is the product of an iterative politico-military dialogue. While
strategic-level planning endows operations with a rational intent,
friction between political leaders and military commanders risks
derailing the promise of strategy. Three case studies - the EU in
Chad, the UN in Lebanon and NATO in Afghanistan - illustrate that
the strategic template for European crisis response operations
relies on deterrence and local capacity building. Building on over
120 interviews with diplomatic officials, military planners and
operation commanders, this book sheds light on the instrumental
nature of military force, the health of civil-military relations in
Europe and the difficulty of making effective strategy in a
multinational environment.
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