Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive
picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially
shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by
the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this
volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game
Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of
Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of
bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is
that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by
bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The
second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic
theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole
of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This
volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic
approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of
non-cooperative games.
General
Imprint: |
Cambridge UniversityPress
|
Country of origin: |
United Kingdom |
Release date: |
November 2005 |
First published: |
1985 |
Editors: |
Alvin E. Roth
|
Dimensions: |
228 x 153 x 22mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
404 |
Edition: |
Paperback Versi |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-521-02274-3 |
Categories: |
Books >
Business & Economics >
Economics >
Economic theory & philosophy
|
LSN: |
0-521-02274-6 |
Barcode: |
9780521022743 |
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