System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used
extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite
this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on
the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually
based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be
complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise
models of the system architecture and its failure modes often
forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to
gathering architectural details about the system behavior from
several sources and embedding this information in the safety
artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes
Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and
safety engineers share a common system model created using a
model-based development process. By extending the system model with
a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system
to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the
safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both
system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety
analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of
the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based
safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making
this approach practical.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!