Professor David Calleo, of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, attempts here to free the interpretations of
German history from the biases and moral indignation aroused by
both World Wars and the Nazi era. Rising to the challenge first
issued by Geoffrey Barraclough in 1965 to take "a fresh look at the
past in the light of the new world that has been emerging since
1945," Calleo asks important questions in a series of interrelated
essays, always reminding the reader that to seek explanations in a
unique German character or situation not only plays into the hands
of non-Germans but also allows Germans once again to set their
nation at the crux of world history. For example, he places
Germany's conduct after 1870 and in World War I into the context of
the larger movements of imperialism and materialism, and he shows
how unhistorical it is to single out German imperialist schemes
which were essentially no different from those of England, France,
and the United States. Calleo agrees that Hitler may have been
unique (subtly arguing that "Hitler. . . failed because he was too
much a German and not enough an Austrian") but he insists that the
pressures that battered Germany after World War I were not.
Hitler's war aims were affected to a great extent by the other
powers, notably by England's desire to suppress German hegemony in
Eastern Europe. In a fascinating section, the author skillfully
tears apart the argument that the excessive success of "German"
Idealism (Hegelian elevation of the state) made of the Germans a
docile, authoritarian people: first he disputes the theoretical
differences between liberalism (freedom derived from a well-ordered
state) and idealism, and then he shows that Germany was not wholly
Idealist nor England wholly liberal. In short, Calleo's thesis is
that in a Europe that had successfully balanced international power
Germany "was not uniquely aggressive, only uniquely inconvenient."
Although the partition of Europe between Russia and the United
States may have solved the specifically German aspects of this
problem, the German case has broad lessons to teach posterity about
the relation between national ambitions and rising expectations.
Those who hold to other interpretations may quarrel with details of
Calleo's treatment, but future studies of Germany and Europe cannot
afford to ignore the point he makes. (Kirkus Reviews)
In this provocative book, David Calleo surveys German history - not
to present new material but to look afresh at the old. He argues
that recent explanations for Germany's external conflicts have
focused on flaws in the country's traditional political
institutions and culture. These German-centred explanations are
convenient Calloe notes, for they tend to exonerate others from
their responsibilities in bringing about two world wars, namely the
American and Russian hegemonies in Europe. As a result of this
approach the big questions in German history are still answered
with the ageing cliches of a generation ago despite the
proliferation of German historical studies. Throughout Professor
Calleo examines with some scepticism the concept of Germany's
uniqueness and its consequences. In effect, his study stresses the
continuing relevance of traditional issues among the Western
states. This book, he asserts, should be regarded as a modest
dissent from the prevailing view that history either began or ended
in 1945.
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