At the turn of the last century, military analysts began to notice
U.S. strategy selection seemed driven by casualty risk, with
optimal strategies being those that yielded the fewest potential
killed, wounded, and missing. In other words, the military yield of
a strategy was subordinated to casualty considerations and these
considerations appeared exaggerated, if not outlandish at the time.
Have Iraq and Afghanistan moved us away from subordinating strategy
to casualty worries or is this argument worth revisiting? This
collection includes the views of Jeffrey Record, Karl P. Mueller,
Charles K. Hyde, and Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. These pieces
originally appeared in military publications of the U.S.
governmentand mark the high tide of our national casualty phobia
debate.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!