Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do
nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt
for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines
a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain
why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German
decision making in the years 1939-1940, analyzing why the Allies
did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and,
conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the
Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian
strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional
conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the
relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to
determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future
crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively
technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM)
on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus
attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to
questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim
that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical
balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought
that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive"
weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration
underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between
those military factors and the broader political considerations
that move a nation to war.
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