Why do institutions emerge, operate, evolve and persist?
Institutional Choice and Global Commerce elaborates a theory of
boundedly rational institutional choice that explains when states
USE available institutions, SELECT among alternative forums, CHANGE
existing rules, or CREATE new arrangements (USCC). The authors
reveal the striking staying power of the institutional status quo
and test their innovative theory against evidence on institutional
choice in global commerce from the nineteenth through the
twenty-first centuries. Cases range from the establishment in 1876
of the first truly international system of commercial dispute
resolution, the Mixed Courts of Egypt, to the founding and
operation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World
Trade Organization, and the International Accounting Standards
Board. Analysts of institutional choice henceforth must take
seriously not only the distinct demands of specific cooperation
dilemmas, but also the wide array of available institutional
choices.
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