States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing
actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they
believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the
crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how
states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries'
long-term intentions. "Knowing the Adversary" draws on a wealth of
historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders
and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments.
Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of
Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of
the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and
the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near
the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical
framework--called selective attention--that emphasizes
organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and
cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision
makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state
behavior that major theories of international politics claim they
do. Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries
on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal
impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations
rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing
more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries.
"Knowing the Adversary" provides a clearer picture of the
historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our
understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in
international security.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!