Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I
be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral
virtue. In "Reasons without Rationalism," Kieran Setiya shows that
these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason
cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including
such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the
considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby
count as reasons to act.
Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason,
Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is
a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the
nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity,
however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we
act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views
about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of
rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good
without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection
without being good.
Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the
explanation of action, "Reasons without Rationalism" is essential
reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the
philosophy of mind.
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