According to many economists, the increasing mobility of capital
across borders has made it more costly to peg exchange rates. This
phenomenon has contributed to some of the more famous examples of
exchange rate crises in recent times, such as the Mexican peso
crisis in 1994 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Yet despite
the increasing costs of pegging in today's accelerated financial
markets, some developing countries try to maintain a peg for as
long as they can. This work is the first to theorize the role of
bankers as a domestic interest group involved in exchange rate
policy. It adds to our understanding of how interest groups affect
economic policy in developing countries and explains why some of
the largest and fastest growing economies in the developing world
were the most prone to crisis. The volume also refines our
understanding of the 'hollowing-out thesis', the argument that
increasing capital mobility is forcing states to abandon pegging.
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