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Intergovernmental Cooperation - Rational Choices in Federal Systems and Beyond (Hardcover, New)
Loot Price: R2,589
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Intergovernmental Cooperation - Rational Choices in Federal Systems and Beyond (Hardcover, New)
Series: Comparative Politics
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Over the past decades, governments have increasingly been
confronted with problems that transcend their boundaries. A
multitude of policy fields are affected, including environment,
trade and security. Responding to the challenges triggered by
Europeanization and globalization, governments increasingly
interact across different spheres of authority. Both theoretically
and empirically, the puzzle of institutional choice reflected by
the variety of arrangements in which intergovernmental cooperation
takes place inside individual countries and across their borders
remains surprisingly under-explored. In an attempt to solve this
puzzle, the book tackles the following questions: Why are the
intergovernmental arrangements governments set up to deal with
boundary-crossing problems so different? To what extent do these
institutional differences affect the effectiveness of
intergovernmental cooperation?
To address this gap theoretically and empirically, this book adopts
a deductive, rationalist approach to institution-building. It
argues that internal politics, the type of executive-legislative
relations within the interacting governments, explains the nature
of institutions set up to channel intergovernmental processes:
while power-sharing governments engage in institution-building,
power-concentrating governments avoid it. It also shows that these
institutional choices matter for the output of intergovernmental
cooperation. The approach is applied to the United States, Canada,
Switzerland, and finally the European Union. Disaggregating
individual government units, the theoretical approach reveals how
intragovernmental micro-incentives drive macro-dynamics and thereby
addresses the neglect of horizontal dynamics in multilevel systems.
The willingness and capacity of lower-level governments to solve
collective problems on their own and to oppose central encroachment
are crucial to understand the power distribution in different
systems and their long-term evolutions.
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