How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11,
the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made
this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver
proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military
relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian
executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed
servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic
but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will
catch and punish misbehavior.
This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based
model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way
of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War
experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military
relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War
ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over
whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as
interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom
that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a
coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself
ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency
theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations
between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
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