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Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law - Volume I Basic Concepts and Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct (Hardcover, 2014 ed.)
Loot Price: R3,537
Discovery Miles 35 370
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Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law - Volume I Basic Concepts and Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct (Hardcover, 2014 ed.)
Expected to ship within 12 - 17 working days
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This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent,
lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and
exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or
E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses
promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the
conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4)
defines price competition and
quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment)
competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately,
(5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and
across-the-board-pricing sellers' price minus marginal cost gaps
and analyses each's determinants, (6) defines the determinants of
the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they
determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both
classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just
at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various
protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the
U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U.
courts, (9) explains that a firm's economic (market) power or
dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment
and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined
non-arbitrarily, a firm's economic power could not be predicted
from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of
"oligopolistic conduct" that some economists have implicitly
used-conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability
depended critically on the perpetrator's belief that its rivals'
responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to
their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct-contrived
and natural-by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or
offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but
not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of
oligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses' implications for
each's antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U.
case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the
evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of
pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory
conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable
unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that
economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether
pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the
conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are
predatory and examines the conditions under which
production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term
full-requirements contracts are predatory.
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