Of the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the
past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government,
while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why
did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for
enforcing federal regulation? "The Litigation State" shows how
government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private
litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize,
through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal
statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates
such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over
the resistance of opposing presidents.
Farhang reveals that private lawsuits, functioning as an
enforcement resource, are a profoundly important component of
American state capacity. He demonstrates how the distinctive
institutional structure of the American state--particularly
conflict between Congress and the president over control of the
bureaucracy--encourages Congress to incentivize private lawsuits.
Congress thereby achieves regulatory aims through a decentralized
army of private lawyers, rather than by well-staffed bureaucracies
under the president's influence. The historical development of
ideological polarization between Congress and the president since
the late 1960s has been a powerful cause of the explosion of
private lawsuits enforcing federal law over the same period.
Using data from many policy areas spanning the twentieth
century, and historical analysis focused on civil rights, "The
Litigation State" investigates how American political institutions
shape the strategic design of legislation to mobilize private
lawsuits for policy implementation.
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