This is the first book-length application of game theory to
Canadian politics. It uses a series of case studies to illustrate
fundamental concepts of game theory such as two-person and n-person
games; solution in mixed strategies; ordinal games; Nash
equilibrium; coordination, Assurance, Chicken and Prisoner's
Dilemma models; Schelling curves; coalition theory and Riker's size
principle; voting rules, cycles, and the Condorcet winner; the
Banzhaf power index; structure-induced equilibrium; and spatial
models of political conflict. No mathematics more complex than
simple algebra is required to follow the exposition.
The case studies are not just contrived illustrations of
abstract models but intensively researched studies of important
episodes in Canadian politics. Topics include the Lubicon Lake
stalemate, metrification and vaccination; the size of winning
coalitions; formulas for amending the Canadian constitution; the
mechanics of choosing party leaders; Parliament's failure to
legislate on abortion after the Morgentaler decision; and the entry
of the Reform Party into the political system. In each case,
utilization of game-theory models produces new and sometimes
surprising conclusions.
Game theory, and the rational-choice paradigm of which it is a
part, are an increasingly important addition to the conventional
modes of political analysis. This book is intended to show what
game theory can add to the philosophical, institutional, and
behavioural approaches that have dominated previous works on
Canadian politics.
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