Within the context of a critique of volitional accounts of action
based on trying, Trying Without Willing articulates a conception of
intentional action based on the notion of de re intention. A
central theme is that volitional theories of action based on the
concept of trying presuppose dubious Cartesian assumptions about
the nature of mind and mental states. There is an original account
of Cartesianism which captures how even the orthodox materialist
theories of action are bound by Cartesian assumptions. Articulating
criticisms of contemporary volitional theories against the backdrop
of this Cartesian picture provides a diagnosis of what is amiss
with all these views and helps motivate a new view of the mind and
its role in intentional action. This view has some affinities with
the view of perception which Hilary Putnam recently articulated in
his Dewey Lectures and John McDowell developed in his recent book
Mind and World. This book will be of interest to professional
philosophers and graduate students as well as anyone seriously
interested in the philosophy of mind, the nature of intentional
action, the problem of mental causation, or the influence of
Cartesiansim in contemporary analytic philosophy.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!