What determines the size and form of redistributive programs,
the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of
taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government
deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of
business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing
literature in political economics attempts to answer these
questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and
disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.Combining the best
of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy,
public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten
Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the
field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave
rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing
preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of
policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency
problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational
choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting
policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common
method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the
main outstanding problems.
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