Why do cease-fire agreements sometimes last for years while
others flounder barely long enough to be announced? How to maintain
peace in the aftermath of war is arguably one of the most important
questions of the post--Cold War era. And yet it is one of the least
explored issues in the study of war and peace. Here, Page Fortna
offers the first comprehensive analysis of why cease-fires between
states succeed or fail. She develops cooperation theory to argue
that mechanisms within these agreements can help maintain peace by
altering the incentives for war and peace, reducing uncertainty,
and helping to prevent or manage accidents that could lead to
war.
To test this theory, the book first explores factors, such as
decisive victory and prior history of conflict, that affect the
baseline prospects for peace. It then considers whether stronger
cease-fires are likely to be implemented in the hardest or the
easiest cases. Next, through both quantitative and qualitative
testing of the effects of cease-fire agreements, firm evidence
emerges that agreements do matter. Durable peace is harder to
achieve after some wars than others, but when most difficult,
states usually invest more in peace building. These efforts work.
Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war.
Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution
commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help
maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.
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