The world perceived at the visual level is constituted not by objects or static forms, but by processes appearing imbued with meaning. As G. Kanizsa stated, at the visual level the line per se does not exist: only the line which enters, goes behind, divides, etc., a line evolving according to a precise holistic context, in comparison with which function and meaning are indissolubly interlinked. Just as the meaning of words is connected with a universe of highly-dynamic functions and functional processes which operate syntheses, cancellations, integrations, etc. (a universe which can only be described in terms of symbolic dynamics), in the same way, at the level of vision, we must continuously unravel and construct schemata; we must assimilate and make ourselves available for selection by the co-ordinated information penetrating from external Reality. Lastly, we must interrelate all this with the internal selection mechanisms through a precise "journey" into the regions of intensionality.
In accordance with these intuitions, we may directly consider, from the more general point of view of contemporary Self-organisation theory, the network of meaningful programs living at the level of neural systems as a complex one which articulates and develops, functionally, within a "coupled universe" characterised by the existence of a double selection: external and internal, the latter regarding the universe of meaning. This network gradually posits itself as the basis for the emergence of natural and meaningful forms and the simultaneous, if indirect, surfacing of an "I-subject-": as the basic instrument, in other words, for the perception of real and meaningful processes, of "objects"possessing meaning, aims, intentions, etc.: above all, of biological objects possessing an inner plan and linked to the progressive expression of a specific cognitive action.

Arturo Carsetti According to molecular Biology, true invariance (life) can exist only within the framework of ongoing autonomous morphogenesis and vice versa. With respect to this secret dialectics, life and cognition appear as indissolubly interlinked. In this sense, for instance, the inner articulation of conceptual spaces appears to be linked to an inner functional development based on a continuous activity of selection and "anchorage" realised on semantic grounds. It is the work of "invention" and g- eration (in invariance), linked with the "rooting" of meaning, which determines the evolution, the leaps and punctuated equilibria, the conditions related to the unfo- ing of new modalities of invariance, an invariance which is never simple repetition and which springs on each occasion through deep-level processes of renewal and recovery. The selection perpetrated by meaning reveals its autonomy aboveall in its underpinning, in an objective way, the ongoing choice of these new modalities. As such it is not, then, concerned only with the game of "possibles," offering itself as a simple channel for pure chance, but with providing a channel for the articulation of the " le" in the humus of a semantic (and embodied) net in order to prepare the necessary conditionsfor a continuousrenewal and recoveryof original creativity. In effect, it is this autonomy in inventing new possible modules of incompressibility whichdeterminestheactualemergenceofnew(andtrue)creativity, whichalsotakes place through the "narration" of the effected construction.

Arturo Carsetti According to molecular Biology, true invariance (life) can exist only within the framework of ongoing autonomous morphogenesis and vice versa. With respect to this secret dialectics, life and cognition appear as indissolubly interlinked. In this sense, for instance, the inner articulation of conceptual spaces appears to be linked to an inner functional development based on a continuous activity of selection and "anchorage" realised on semantic grounds. It is the work of "invention" and g- eration (in invariance), linked with the "rooting" of meaning, which determines the evolution, the leaps and punctuated equilibria, the conditions related to the unfo- ing of new modalities of invariance, an invariance which is never simple repetition and which springs on each occasion through deep-level processes of renewal and recovery. The selection perpetrated by meaning reveals its autonomy aboveall in its underpinning, in an objective way, the ongoing choice of these new modalities. As such it is not, then, concerned only with the game of "possibles," offering itself as a simple channel for pure chance, but with providing a channel for the articulation of the " le" in the humus of a semantic (and embodied) net in order to prepare the necessary conditionsfor a continuousrenewal and recoveryof original creativity. In effect, it is this autonomy in inventing new possible modules of incompressibility whichdeterminestheactualemergenceofnew(andtrue)creativity, whichalsotakes place through the "narration" of the effected construction.

Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the "internal realist" perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of "facts" without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing."