As a rule, countries consider clearly defined international borders to be paramount for their survival and prosperity. Most borders gain definition peacefully and, once they do, these definitions stick (i.e., the border remains settled). The failure to define borders, however, produces protracted, geopolitical, militarized competitions (or rivalries) between neighboring countries. Rider and Owsiak model this failure as a particular type of bargaining problem - namely, bargaining over territory that affects the distribution of power between neighbouring states significantly - that undermines efforts to resolve border disagreements peacefully. Countries must then overcome this bargaining problem or risk falling into a protracted rivalry, which then needs to be addressed with more resources. The authors develop a theory of how borders settle. They then explore the consequences of the failure to settle, theoretically connecting it to the onset of rivalries. This leads to the process that helps rivals overcome the bargaining problem, resolve their border disagreement, and terminate their rivalry.

This book asks scholars to reexamine international conflict and its management-in order to move the field toward directly theorizing about and examining the interdependence between conflict events and conflict management attempts. Despite decades of work, research on international conflict and its management remains siloed in three fundamental ways. First, scholars do not thoroughly address international conflict dynamics within studies of conflict management, even though the former give rise to the latter. Second, existing work generally investigates one conflict management strategy (e.g., mediation) at the expense of others (e.g., adjudication). These strategies, however, are not independent of one another; they exist on a single menu from which potential third parties choose. Third parties therefore implicitly-if not explicitly-consider and select among the various strategies when deciding how to manage a conflict, thereby inviting and incorporating comparisons. Finally, researchers tend to treat conflict management efforts-even within the same conflict-as independent events, even though some efforts (e.g., adjudication or arbitration) follow and explicitly relate to other, earlier efforts (e.g., an earlier negotiation or mediation). In short, elements of sequencing and interaction influence conflict management, even as scholars rarely consider such elements. This book will be of great value to scholars and researchers of Political Science, International Relations and Conflict Management and Resolution. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of International Interactions.

As a rule, countries consider clearly defined international borders to be paramount for their survival and prosperity. Most borders gain definition peacefully and, once they do, these definitions stick (i.e., the border remains settled). The failure to define borders, however, produces protracted, geopolitical, militarized competitions (or rivalries) between neighboring countries. Rider and Owsiak model this failure as a particular type of bargaining problem - namely, bargaining over territory that affects the distribution of power between neighbouring states significantly - that undermines efforts to resolve border disagreements peacefully. Countries must then overcome this bargaining problem or risk falling into a protracted rivalry, which then needs to be addressed with more resources. The authors develop a theory of how borders settle. They then explore the consequences of the failure to settle, theoretically connecting it to the onset of rivalries. This leads to the process that helps rivals overcome the bargaining problem, resolve their border disagreement, and terminate their rivalry.