How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S. intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies, and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both at within the United States and abroad. The U.S. government's progress in establishing a system for homeland security is considerable, yet, besides shifts in alert status, most U.S. residents are unaware of the work being done to keep them safe. Describing the system already in place, Hulnick adds further ideas about what more is needed to protect Americans in the ever-changing world of intelligence. To create a truly valuable program, it is suggested the the United States consider not only new strategies and tactics, but also the need to break down the barriers between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

With the end of the Cold War and the dawning of a new century, the U.S. intelligence system faces new challenges and threats. The system has suffered from penetration by foreign agents, cutbacks in resources, serious errors in judgment, and what appears to be bad management; nonetheless, it remains one of the key elements of America's strategic defense. Hulnick suggests that things are not as bad as they seem, that America's intelligence system is reasonably well prepared to deal with the many threats to national security. He examines the various functions of intelligence from intelligence gathering and espionage to the arcane fields of analysis, spy-catching, secret operations, and even the business of corporate espionage.

Hulnick offers a variety of ideas for making the system work better and for attracting the kinds of new intelligence professionals who will build a stronger intelligence system in the next century. "Fixing the Spy Machine" suggests that the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the person who runs both the CIA and oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community, should be depoliticized and made stronger. It also concludes that people are responsible for making the system function, not its bureaucratic structure. Still, intelligence managers are going to have to become less risk-averse and more flexible if the system is to function at its best.

With the end of the Cold War and the dawning of a new century, the U.S. intelligence system faces new challenges and threats. The system has suffered from penetration by foreign agents, cutbacks in resources, serious errors in judgment, and what appears to be bad management; nonetheless, it remains one of the key elements of America's strategic defense. Hulnick suggests that things are not as bad as they seem, that America's intelligence system is reasonably well prepared to deal with the many threats to national security. He examines the various functions of intelligence from intelligence gathering and espionage to the arcane fields of analysis, spy-catching, secret operations, and even the business of corporate espionage.

Hulnick offers a variety of ideas for making the system work better and for attracting the kinds of new intelligence professionals who will build a stronger intelligence system in the next century. "Fixing the Spy Machine" suggests that the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the person who runs both the CIA and oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community, should be depoliticized and made stronger. It also concludes that people are responsible for making the system function, not its bureaucratic structure. Still, intelligence managers are going to have to become less risk-averse and more flexible if the system is to function at its best.