This collection of nine essays selected from the nonjudical writings of Judge J. Skelly Wright deals with many of the important legal-policy questions of his career. Emphasizing his long-held belief that the disadvantaged should receive special protection, he details some of the ways in which the courts have failed to meet the needs of the underprivileged. He expands his views on judical activism, the uses and abuses of money in America's political process, and other of his abiding concerns. Each essay is preceded by an introductory statement discussing the content of the article.

Miller proposes that we focus our energies on the question of how the Constitution is to function in an era of rapid and fundamental social change. He introduces this provocative collection of essays with the observation that American constitutional theory has arrived at a dead-end, largely because it has been perceived as "constitutional law" rather than a form of political theory. He puts this view into sharp perspective by looking at what are in effect, three constitutions--the political, the economic, and the emergent corporate instrument. He analyzes important issues that confront the Supreme Court, policymakers, and theorists, such as the expansion of government control, the Court as a political mechanism, the power of corporations, politics and the First Amendment, the challenge of nuclear weapons, and questions relating to social justice, including equal protection and the right to employment.

This book presents a rounded critique of the conventional wisdom about the legality of nuclear weapons by experts in international and constitutional law. Part I addresses the status of nuclear weapons under international law. Scholars on one side of the question draw upon treaties and international custom to argue that most uses of nuclear weapons are illegal and that even mere possession of such weaponry is legally unjustifiable. Others argue that law cannot be imposed on the nuclear weapons states without their consent and that nuclear weapons provide deterrence that binds the superpowers in a peaceful balance of power. Part I concludes with a comprehensive bibliography on nuclear weapons and international law. Part II, the section that focuses on nuclear weapons and American constitutional law, offers widely divergent approaches and conclusions. Although there is no explicit prohibition of such weapons in the United States Constitution, several contributors suggest that the advent of nuclear weapons has so changed the milieu in which constitutional institutions operate that many accepted conclusions must be reexamined. Part III explores the effects of nuclear weapons on the environment and the medical consequences of nuclear war.