The United States and Iran have been in conflict since the Iranian Revolution. Iran is seeking to increase its power in the Middle East while America is seeking to maintain its own power in the region while simultaneously containing Iran's regional ambitions. Though there appear to have been attempts by Iranian moderates to temper Iranian policy towards the US, extremists within Iran's domestic power structure have successfully blocked any significant openings. Since at least the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has been developing nuclear technology to acquire the nuclear fuel cycle.

Doctrinal differences over the employment of airpower are as old as military aviation itself. One particular area of contention has been close air support (CAS).The two primary issues related to CAS are its command and control and responsiveness. Soldiers have argued that ground commanders should control their own aircraft, because ownership assures that airpower directly responds to their needs. Airmen have maintained that airpower should be centralized under a single air commander to allow for its flexible theater wide employment. During World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, ground commanders demanded greater influence over airpower employment. Concurrently, the Air Force disagreed with the Navy and Marine Corps over centralized versus decentralized control of air assets. These two issues of command and control and responsiveness are embodied in the process of apportioning and allocating CAS. In all conflicts since World War II, the United States has had the luxury of an overabundance of air assets. Despite a facade of centralization, airpower was parceled out to fill nearly everyone's needs. This avoided the need for any difficult choices. This study follows the history of CAS since World War II to examine how it has been apportioned and allocated in the past. It then examines the current joint air operations process. It is the contention of this study that the current system, rooted in its historical past, does not fully employ CAS to its optimum potential. The historical view of CAS has been as a tactical measure, with limited localized effects. However, properly integrated and coequal with the ground scheme of maneuver, it can have operational level effects. This study examines two theories of the use of CAS at the operational level and then recommends changes to the view of CAS and the process for its apportionment and allocation.